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RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE 
  2019 2020 2021 –  Deal 
2021 –  
No Deal  
Output (Real Annual Growth %)        
Private Consumer Expenditure 3.2 -9.0 11.7 10.7 
Public Net Current Expenditure 6.3 9.1 2.0 2.0 
Investment 74.8 -13.6 5.8 3.6 
Exports 10.5 4.6 6.0 1.0 
Imports 32.4 -5.3 8.0 4.1 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 5.6 3.4 4.9 1.5 
Gross National Product (GNP) 3.4 0.3 4.3 1.1 
  
   
 
Labour Market 
   
 
Employment Levels (‘000)  2,322  1,949 2,072  2,059 
Unemployment Levels (‘000) 121 435 351 363 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 5.0 18.4 14.5 15.0 
         
Public Finances        
General Government Balance (€bn) 1.3 -22.6  -18.5  
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The Irish Economy – Overview 
 
• While COVID-19 continues to exert a contractionary impact on the Irish 
domestic economy, it is clear that most sectors registered a significant 
recovery in output in Q3 2020. Consumption and investment witnessed a 
substantial rebound in activity after the impacts of the general lockdown 
in Q2 2020 while exports continued to grow through the third quarter.  
• The presence of a six-week Level 5 lockdown in Q4 2020 will have a further 
contractionary impact on domestic sources of growth. However, it is now 
clear that the Irish economy will register output growth for the present 
year. We expect GDP to increase by 3.4 per cent in 2020. 
• Notwithstanding this somewhat surprising result, the legacy of the 
COVID-19 shock is still substantial and is likely to impact the domestic 
economy and labour market for some time. The unemployment rate, 
which had averaged around 5 per cent at the start of the year, is now set 
to be 20 per cent by the year end. In a Special Article in this Commentary, 
Doorley et al. (2020) considers the COVID-19 income supports, the impact 
of Budget 2021 and potential reforms as the impacts of the pandemic 
unwind. 
• For 2021 we assume there will be another six-week Level 5 lockdown in 
the first half of the year. This follows the easing of Government restrictions 
for the Christmas period in Q4 2020. However, we also assume that a 
vaccine is rolled out extensively amongst the general population from 
Q3 2021 onwards. Therefore, economic activity will be assumed to return 
to normal during the latter half of 2021. In this case the unemployment 
rate will average 15 per cent and GDP is expected to increase by 4.9 per 
cent.  
• Our expectation for 2021 is for a Brexit free trade agreement to be 
operational from January. However, we have also prepared a separate set 
of forecasts for 2021 where such a deal does not exist. In this case, the 
growth rate of the domestic economy could drop to 1.5 per cent. 
Irrespective of whether there is a free trade agreement or not, changes 
due to Brexit in the new year are likely to result in increases in prices for 
certain household items. 
• Given the increased cost of the pandemic to the public Exchequer, the 
present Commentary devotes a significant amount of attention to fiscal 
related issues. A Box by Allen-Coghlan and McQuinn examines the 
sustainability of Irish debt levels under plausible future growth scenarios, 
while a Special Article by Allen-Coghlan, McQuinn and Varthalitis examines 
the impact on domestic growth that the ECB can have by alleviating the 
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financial burden of the crisis for the domestic economy. A second Box by 
McQuinn discusses the implications for Irish corporation tax receipts of the 
change in the US political administration. 
• Finally, a Research Note in the Commentary by Allen-Coghlan and 
Varthalitis compares and contrasts the impact that the pandemic and the 
global financial crisis have had on the Irish economy.  
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• For 2021 we assume a vaccine is successfully rolled out for the latter half of the 
year and a Brexit trade deal is in place. 
• A six-week Level 5 lockdown is also assumed to occur in the first half of 2021. 
• Overall, Irish GDP is set to increase by 3.4 per cent in the present year and 
4.9 per cent in 2021. 
• If no trade deal exists between the UK and the EU, GDP will grow by 1.5 per 
cent in 2021. 
 
Forecast scenarios 
The final quarter of the present year has seen two countervailing developments in 
terms of the ongoing impact of COVID-19; one is the impact of a second or Level 5 
lockdown for six weeks in Q4 2020 and the second is the optimism concerning the 
development of a vaccine for the virus. 
 
We reflect these two developments in our scenario analysis for the Irish economy 
as follows: 
1. For 2020, we conduct one forecast, which now allows for a Level 5 lockdown 
in the fourth quarter of the year. 
2. For 2021 we assume a further six-week Level 5 lockdown in the first half of 
2021. However, we then allow for the roll-out of a vaccine for the latter two 
quarters of the year. 
3. The 2021 scenario assumes that a comprehensive trade deal is struck between 
the United Kingdom and the European Union. However, we also present 
results if no such agreement is reached. As with the previous Commentary, we 
draw heavily upon the work of Daly and Lawless (2020)1 and a Box in the 
Autumn Commentary by Bergin et al. (2020). 
 
Overall, 2020 will see the most profound decline in domestic sources of growth for 
the Irish economy on record. Both consumption and investment are forecast to 
witness falls of approximately 9 and 14 per cent respectively. Unemployment, 
which had at the start of year averaged less than 5 per cent, is now set to average 
 
                                                            
 
1  Daly, L. and M. Lawless, 2020. ‘Examination of the Sectoral Overlap of Covid-19 and Brexit Shocks’, Papers WP677, 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
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18 per cent for the year. This constitutes a dramatic reversal of recent Irish 
economic trends. 
 
However, for 2020, our forecasts now indicate that the Irish economy, in GDP 
terms, will grow by 3.4 per cent. This upward revision to the GDP forecast is due to 
the export sector, which has registered an exceptional performance in the present 
year. As noted in the previous Commentary, this has been heavily influenced by a 
relatively small number of firms in the pharmaceutical and computer services 
sectors. The severity of the shock to household expenditure and domestic 
investment activity is closely in line with our previous considerations.  
 
For 2021, following the outcome observed in 2020, a Level 5 lockdown is assumed 
to occur in the first half of 2021. However, a vaccine is also assumed to be 
successfully rolled out amongst the general population for the latter half of the 
year. Despite the presence of the six-week Level 5 lockdown in the first half of 
2021, we expect to see a significant recovery in domestic sources of growth with 
consumption, in particular, registering growth of just under 12 per cent. The export 
sector is also likely to consolidate its 2020 performance and increase by 6 per cent 
next year. Overall, this results in output growth of 4.9 per cent in 2021. 
 
Under an alternative scenario, where no deal is reached between the UK and the 
EU and as a result a WTO arrangement occurs, we follow the analysis in the 
previous Commentary and expect domestic economic growth to be significantly 
impacted in the short term. As outlined in a Box in the Autumn Commentary by 
Bergin et al., the impact of there being a No-Deal Brexit has significant negative 
implications for the economy which tend to accumulate over the longer term. 
Following a similar analysis in the Spring Commentary by Economides and McQuinn 
(2019), our analysis indicates that Irish GDP will only grow by 1.5 per cent in 2021 
in the event of a no-deal between the UK and the EU. 
 
  




• Consumption expenditure rebounded rapidly in Q3 2020 having fallen by over 
one-fifth in Q2 2020.  
• Level 5 restrictions in Q4 2020 will limit the recovery in consumption but the 
moderation is not expected to be as severe as the first lockdown.  
• With an effective vaccine becoming available in the second half of 2021, a 
strong recovery in consumption can be expected as households unwind excess 
savings. 
 
Household sector consumption  
Understanding the trajectory of household spending has become extremely 
difficult since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Traditionally a relatively stable 
relationship exists between spending and household incomes and wealth. 
However, the combination of public health restrictions (limiting expenditure 
choices), labour market shocks from the economic fallout and other behavioural 
changes (such as precautionary savings or the avoidance of activities where 
transmission may occur) pose difficulties in accurately plotting a course for 
spending at the present time.  
 
Understanding the relative impact of these factors is critical in assessing how 
spending may evolve in the face of rolling levels of public health measures. A 
further complicating factor in forecasting consumption patterns is the adaptability 
of households and firms to use more COVID-friendly purchasing methods such as 
online and click and collect.2  
 
The initial lockdown period, with the strictest public health measures to date, was 
associated with a fall in consumption in Ireland of over 20 per cent in Q2 2020 year-
on-year. When coupled with the fall in Q1 2020, the drop in consumption in Ireland 
was one of the largest falls in a European context (O’Toole, 2020).3 However, the 
resumption of economic activity in the third quarter of 2020 led to a rapid rebound 
in spending, with consumption down approximately 5.7 per cent year-on-year in 
Q3 2020. Figure 1 presents the trend in consumption in Ireland. The pronounced 
drop and recovery in spending is clearly evident.  
 
                                                            
 
2  Indeed, recent CSO data indicate that in April 2020 online sales as a percentage of turnover increased from circa 6 per 
cent to just under 20 per cent. While it moderated over the summer period, it has increased from 6.2 per cent in 
September 2020 to 8.2 per cent in October. The overall level masks higher usage in non-food expenditure.  
3  O’Toole C. (2020). ‘The lockdown tale of two economies in Ireland: How big tech and pharma bucked the trend’, 
Research Note in Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn. 
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FIGURE 1 QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT 
MARKET PRICES AND SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED – GROWTH RATES 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
While household spending dropped dramatically in Q2 2020, household incomes 
did not fall to the same extent (see Beirne et al., 20204 and Coffey et al., 2020);5 
this is due to a combination of the new pandemic-related income supports for 
those becoming unemployed coupled with the fact that many sectors were 
unaffected by the pandemic. This has led to a major increase in the savings ratio to 
over 35 per cent in Q2 2020 (Figure 2). The ten-year average rate was just under 
10 per cent, which highlights the extraordinary change which occurred in Q2 2020. 
With public health restrictions limiting the consumption bundle available to 
households it is not surprising that savings increased markedly. Recent research by 
FitzGerald (2020)6 notes the possibility of these savings providing a potential 
stimulus to the domestic economy when public health restrictions are lifted. Two 
key issues which arise in that context are; what goods and services will households 
use these funds for, and at what speed will households consume the excess 
savings?  
 
                                                            
 
4  Beirne K., K. Doorley, M. Regan, B. Roantree and D. Tuda (2020). The potential costs and distributional effect of 
COVID-19 related unemployment in Ireland, Budget Perspectives 2021, Paper 1, April. Economic and Social Research 
Institute (ESRI). 
5  Coffey, C., K. Doorley, C. O’Toole and B. Roantree (2020). The effect of the COVID 19 pandemic on consumption and 
indirect tax in Ireland, ESRI Budget Perspectives 2021, Paper 3. 
6  FitzGerald, J. (2020). ‘The Effects of Government Policy on Personal Savings’, Quarterly Economic Commentary, 
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FIGURE 2 EVOLUTION OF THE GROSS SAVINGS RATIO IN IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. Savings rate is calculated as the difference between gross disposable income and final consumption 
expenditure from the institutional accounts scaled by gross disposable income.  
 
Figure 3 provides some context for the recovery in domestic consumption by 
presenting the year-on-year changes across Q2 and Q3 2020 for Ireland and 
selected other European economies. Naturally, the scale of the consumption 
decline was dependent on the severity of the public health restrictions, the degree 
to which incomes and the labour market adjusted (and were supported by policy), 
the severity of the disease outbreak and the relative changes in households’ own 
behaviour. These cross-country data show that the Q3 2020 performance in Ireland 
was in the mid-range of other European countries.  
 
FIGURE 3 YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGE IN CONSUMPTION FOR SELECTED EUROPEAN ECONOMIES 
  
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. Series: Final consumption expenditure of households, chain linked volumes (2010), seasonally- and 
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Despite the rapid and severe decline in expenditure in the first and second quarter, 
real time indicators of expenditure such as retail sales data demonstrate the 
sustained and strong recovery as the economy was reopened. Table 1 presents the 
year-on-year change in retail sales by item for the period March to October 2020. 
While nearly all spending categories declined between March and May (with the 
exception of expenditure on food and beverages), a strong rebound is evident from 
June through until the end of September 2020. The re-introduction of stricter 
public health measures in October 2020, when the country moved to Level 5 on 
the Government’s Living with COVID-19 plan, likely led to a slowdown in spending. 
Notwithstanding this, on an annualised basis, expenditure remained higher in 
October 2020 than in the same period in the previous year.  
 
What is clear from the evidence in relation to the tighter restrictions in October 
2020 is that the most recent lockdown is leading to a very different outcome in 
terms of the composition of retail sales relative to the April-June 2020 period. 
Indeed, while all non-food items in retail sales experienced a decline in April and 
May 2020, the second lockdown (as evidenced by October data which cover a 
period of the Level 5 lockdown) has led to a drop in only certain non-food items 
such as sales in department stores, clothing and textiles, bars and automotive fuel. 
The fact that other retail activities such as hardware stores were able to remain 
open has allowed expenditure in these areas to be maintained. Year-on-year 
changes in the different items can be seen in Table 1 with the colour coding 
indicating the magnitude of the decline and the recovery. Three different 
outcomes can be observed across the different items; sales of food and related 
products have increased markedly since the pandemic and have remained high; 
retail sales of entertainment and hospitality activity have been permanently 
reduced and only experienced a moderate recovery over the summer; and other 
activities such as expenditure on household equipment and other non-durable 
consumption items has witnessed almost a complete recovery in sales.  
 
TABLE 1  YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGES IN RETAIL SALES (SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED VOLUMES) BY 
MONTH 
  March April May June July August Sept October 
Motor trades -30% -81% -50% 4% 15% 14% 18% 6% 
Department stores -28% -78% -54% -15% -15% -4% 6% -3% 
Retail sale of automotive fuel -15% -50% -37% -17% -11% -6% -10% -21% 
Bars -58% -92% -92% -82% -48% -40% -50% -75% 
All retail businesses -11% -44% -25% 4% 9% 9% 11% 8% 
Retail sale of food 18% 17% 17% 16% 10% 10% 11% 16% 
Household equipment  12% -50% -20% 20% 23% 26% 30% 31% 
Textiles, clothing and footwear  -47% -82% -79% -17% 2% -2% 3% -7% 
Books, stationery and other goods  -5% -44% -3% 19% 16% 14% 16% 32% 
Medical and cosmetic articles  14% -15% -11% 3% 2% 8% 17% 7% 
 
Source:  CSO Retail Sales Data. 
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The differing trends moving through the first lockdown, reopening and then second 
lockdown can be further highlighted by exploring the peak to trough falls in retail 
sales in Figure 4. The figures presented are the change relative to February 2020. 
The trough is in April 2020, the peak is in September 2020 and October is when the 
Level 5 lockdown was re-introduced. It is clear that while the recovery was broad 
based, the changing composition of the more recent restrictions has ensured that 
the drop-off in consumption in October was not as extreme. This may also be due 
to the increased ability of both households and firms to adapt to the restrictions in 
addition to the more targeted measures for sectoral closures. However, the 
lockdown only occurred for part of October, and data for November 2020 – when 
available – will provide more insight into the Level 5 impacts as these restrictions 
were in place for the entirety of this month. 
 
FIGURE 4  RECOVERY IN RETAIL SALES ACTIVITY (FALLS RELATIVE TO FEBRUARY 2020) 
  
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of CSO Retail Sales Data. Seasonally-adjusted volumes data used.  
 
To provide further insight into the determinants of consumer spending for 2020, 
we explore recent trends in consumer sentiment. The figures below provide trends 
in consumer sentiment for Ireland, the UK and the EU27 for the period July 2019 
to November 2020. The index takes the value of 100 in January 2020. The onset of 
the pandemic is associated with a rapid and extensive drop in consumer confidence 
as households were subject to the restrictions and the associated economic shocks. 
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was greater (relative to January 2020) and the recovery has been considerably 
more muted. Indeed, consumer confidence in August 2020 dipped below the July 
level which likely reflects the increased public discourse concerning the pick-up in 
infections observed from August onwards.  
 
The beginning of the second wave of infections and associated restrictions at the 
end of September/beginning of October 2020 saw sentiment dip back in other 
countries. Remarkably, Irish sentiment rose dramatically in November which is 
somewhat surprising given the imposition of Level 5 restrictions.  
 




Source:  European Commission data and ESRI calculation.  
Note:  The positive/negative balances from the EU COF series are transformed by adding 100. We then set the base to 100 in January 
2020 with growth relative to this point i.e. ((Yt/YJan2010) -1)*100.  
 
Consumption forecasts 
In order to provide a ‘bottom up’ figure for consumption for the fourth quarter of 
2020 which reflects the trend in expenditure and consumer sentiment 
documented above, we follow a similar approach to that developed in Coffey et al. 
(2020) and McQuinn et al. (2020) and link the consumer spending activity at an 
itemised level mainly to developments in the CSO retail sales data and the Central 
Bank credit card data. Selected other data sources including the Household Budget 
Survey are also used in the process.7 This leads us to expect a year-on-year change 
in consumption for 2020 of -9 per cent.  
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Plotting the trajectory for 2021 is more challenging given the ongoing uncertainty 
around the level of infections and lockdown severity that may be required ahead 
of any widespread roll-out of the vaccine. Our baseline assumption is that a six-
week period of strict public health measures will be required at some stage during 
the first half of 2020. We then assume a broad-based recovery in the third and 
fourth quarters of next year on the assumption that an effective vaccine is 
distributed broadly in the population. In this scenario, incomes grow modestly 
through next year and households adjust their savings rate downwards, 
particularly over the latter half of the year. We assume a drop in the savings rate 
to 15 per cent in Q3 and 12.5 per cent in Q4. This results in consumption growth 
rate for next year of approximately 11.7 per cent. In the event of a No-Deal Brexit, 
we follow Bergin et al. (2019)8 and assume that the level of consumption will be 
0.9 percentage points lower than if a deal were to exist. Our consumption forecast 
under a no-deal is therefore 10.7 per cent.  
 
Developments in consumer prices 
Since the onset of the pandemic there has been a consistent drop in consumer 
prices. At the outset of the pandemic, it was uncertain as to whether prices would 
rise due to the likely supply-side shocks of the pandemic or fall due to a likely 
reduction in consumer demand. The year-on-year change in the Consumer Price 
Index is -0.2 per cent on average for the first ten months of 2020. Figure 6 displays 
the trend in the overall (all items) CPI inflation rate and the contribution to the 
change made by the main subcomponents. It is clear a marked downward trend in 
inflation occurred concurrent with the pandemic. The inflation rate was -1.5 per 
cent in October 2020. The main items putting downward pressure on prices were 
transport prices, energy costs, housing and utilities. It therefore appears that 
overall, in terms of the impact on consumer prices, demand shocks have 
predominated over supply-side shocks to date. However, these effects may change 
as the economy recovers.  
 
 
                                                            
 
8  Bergin, A., P. Economides, A. Garcia-Rodriguez and G. Murphy (2019). ‘Ireland and Brexit: modelling the impact of deal 
and no-deal scenarios’, Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special Articles. 
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FIGURE 6 CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION: CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGE IN CPI BY COMPONENT: 
YEAR-ON-YEAR % CHANGE 
 
 
Source:  CSO and ESRI calculations.  
 
Looking forward to 2021, the impact of Brexit on consumer prices is likely 
regardless of whether a deal or no-deal outcome occurs, in particular through the 
food products that are imported from the UK. Previous research by Lawless (2018)9 
suggests that a hard Brexit would increase the cost of living for all households in 
Ireland by between 2-3 per cent. The increase would be greater for lower income 
households due to the higher share of food products in their expenditure basket. 
However, the rise in prices is likely to be affected by exchange rate movements 
between the euro and sterling; a rise in the euro vis-à-vis sterling would make UK 
imports cheaper and may offset product inflation due to tariff or non-tariff cost 
frictions. The exchange rate effects have been considered in a Box in a previous 
Commentary, (Box 1 ‘Exchange rate pass-through – EUR/GBP’ in McQuinn et al., 




                                                            
 





























• Exports continued to grow strongly in Q3 2020 following robust growth in the 
previous quarter. 
• The main drivers of export growth have been medicinal and pharmaceutical 
goods and ICT which have grown strongly throughout the pandemic. 
• Irish exports are forecast to register strong growth in 2021 as the economies of 
our main trading partners recover next year. 
• However, this growth would be significantly hampered by a No-Deal Brexit. 
 
The robust performance of the Irish traded sector was the reason why Irish GDP 
declined by less than most other European economies in Q2 2020. Despite the 
adverse impact of the pandemic on the economies of our main trading partners 
over this period, the volume of Irish exports continued to grow, increasing by 
0.8 per cent in the second quarter compared to the same period the previous year. 
This was driven by strong growth in Irish goods exports which increased by 9.7 per 
cent.  
 
The resilience of the traded sector has again been evidenced in Q3 2020 with 
exports increasing by 5.3 per cent annually. Again, this was driven by the strong 
growth of goods exports which increased by 14.3 per cent. Though annual growth 
in services exports remained negative, the magnitude of the decline improved 
to -4.4 per cent in Q3 from -8.5 per cent in Q2. 
 
FIGURE 7  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED EXPORTS: YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (VOLUME, %) 
 
 









2018Q1 2018Q2 2018Q3 2018Q4 2019Q1 2019Q2 2019Q3 2019Q4 2020Q1 2020Q2 2020Q3
Export of Goods Export of Services Exports of Goods and Services
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O’Toole (2020) highlighted that one of the primary reasons for the robustness of 
Irish exports in Q2 2020 was the strong performance of medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products which account for the largest share of goods exports. 
Figure 8 shows that exports of this commodity group have continued to increase 
in Q3, up by 2.3 per cent compared to the previous quarter and 17.8 per cent 
compared to Q3 2019. While the strong growth of this commodity sector is 
undoubtedly a positive for the Irish economy, the fact that this sector is dominated 
by a small number of multinational corporations means that the Irish economy as 
a whole is particularly vulnerable to the individual performance of a relatively small 
number of companies.  
 
However, unlike in Q2 the strong export growth in Q3 appears to be broader based 
with exports across a range of commodity groups increasing over the period. 
Between Q2 and Q3 the three next largest groups of goods exports, Organic 
chemicals, Machinery and transport equipment, and Miscellaneous manufactured 
goods each grew by 15.2, 9.7 and 26.6 per cent respectively.  
 
FIGURE 8  MERCHANDISE EXPORTS BY COMMODITY GROUP (VALUE, € MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
While service exports, as a whole, declined over the third quarter, the largest 
component of service exports recorded further growth. Computer services, which 
accounted for 53 per cent of total service exports in 2019, grew by 4.3 per cent in 
Q3 compared to Q2 and 9.9 per cent compared to the same period the previous 
year. As shown in Figure 9 the performance of service exports is largely determined 
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by the performance of the computer services sector. Like the pharmaceutical 
sector, the computer services sector in Ireland is highly concentrated. This exposes 
the Irish economy to considerable company-specific idiosyncratic risk.  
 
While business services declined by 3.1 per cent in Q3 relative to Q2, the next three 
largest service export components registered positive growth. Financial services, 
Insurance and Royalties/Licenses each increased by 6.9, 2.6 and 6.1 per cent 
respectively.  
 
FIGURE 9  SERVICE EXPORTS BY COMPONENT (VALUE, € MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 10 shows that annual import growth remained negative in Q3 2020 as 
imports of both goods and services declined over the period. Compared to Q3 2019 
imports were down by 10.5 per cent, with goods imports declining 8.1 per cent and 
services declining by 11.7 per cent. Although the magnitudes of these declines are 
significantly lower than Q2, it is likely that the importation of intellectual property 
and aircraft related to leasing were distorting the data over this period. 
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FIGURE 10  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED IMPORTS: YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (VOLUME, %) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 11 shows merchandise imports by main use. In Q3 2020 the majority of 
merchandise imports fell under the category of materials for production (goods 
that are imported for use in the production process of Irish firms). Despite declines 
in economic activity over the second quarter of this year, imports of this category 
of goods continued to grow by 3.3 per cent. This positive growth trend continued 
into Q3, increasing by 4.1 per cent year-on-year. This may be related to the strong 
performance of goods exports over the same period with these imports necessary 
for increased production. The largest decline in merchandise imports over this 
period has been in producer capital goods which declined by 51.5 per cent in Q2 
and 31.4 per cent in Q3. This reflects the fall in investment by Irish firms over this 
period. The annual growth in consumption goods also fell in Q2, down by 2.8 per 
cent but in Q3 these imports grew positively by 3.0 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 11  MERCHANDISE IMPORTS BY MAIN USE (VALUE, € MILLION) 
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At the time of writing the EU and UK remain locked in negotiations about a future 
trade deal post the current transition period. The outcome of these negotiations 
will have significant repercussions for bilateral trade between Ireland and the UK. 
Work by Lawless and Morgenroth (2019)10 estimates the impact of a no trade deal 
Brexit on the bilateral trade flows between the UK and EU Member States. In their 
analysis, in which they apply WTO tariffs to trade between the UK and EU, they 
estimated that Irish goods exports to the UK could decline by 31 per cent (4 per 
cent of total Irish exports) in the event of a no-deal, while imports from the UK 
could decline by 28 per cent (1.5 per cent of total imports). These results were 
based on the increase in tariffs that would result from a no-deal outcome. 
However, additional factors such as administrative and legal issues that would also 
result from a no-deal would also act as a barrier to trade between the two 
countries.  
 
Figure 12 shows Irish trade with the UK in Q2 2020. Over this period the value of 
merchandise imports from the UK was greater than exports resulting in a trade 
deficit of €0.9 billion. Exports of services to the UK were greater than imports 
resulting in a surplus of €4.1 billion. Overall, Irish exports to the UK were greater 
than imports resulting in a trade surplus of €3.2 billion.  
 
FIGURE 12  TRADE WITH THE UK IN Q3 2020 (VALUE, € MILLION)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
 
                                                            
 
10  Lawless, M. and E.L.W. Morgenroth (2019). ‘The product and sector level impact of a hard Brexit across the EU’, 













18|  Q ua rte r ly  Econ om ic  Com me nta ry  –  Win te r  2020  
 
The strong performance of exports witnessed in Q3 is expected to continue into 
Q4 of this year. As a result, total exports for 2020 are expected to increase by 
4.6 per cent for the year. As the vaccine is rolled out globally next year and the 
economies of Ireland’s largest trading partners are expected to record positive 
growth, Irish exports should continue to grow positively. As a result, export growth 
for 2021 is forecast at 6.0 per cent. However, significant downside risk remains in 
place for next year in the form of Brexit and weaker than expected recovery in 
international demand.  
 
On the back of declining imports over the first three quarters of 2020, total imports 
for the year are expected to decline by 5.3 per cent. As exports, investment and 
consumption all pick up next year, imports are also forecast to increase up to 
8.0 per cent for 2021.  
 
If a no trade deal outcome were to prevail between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union, we again follow Bergin et al. (2019) and assume that the level of 
exports and imports would be 5 and 4 percentage points lower than would 
otherwise be the case. In that scenario, exports would increase by 1 per cent in 
2021, while imports would grow by 4 per cent.  
 
  




• Modified investment declined by 4.0 per cent annually in Q3 compared to -24.5 
per cent in Q2. 
• We expect approximately 18,500 housing completions in 2020 and 19,500 in 
2021. 
• Investment forecast to decline by 13.6 per cent in 2020 and grow by 5.8 per 
cent in 2021. 
 
Overall gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF) declined by 13.0 per cent 
in Q3 2020 compared to the same period the previous year. While this decline in 
investment is significant, it is substantially less than the 70.6 per cent decline in 
GDFCF in Q2. However, given the well-publicised distortionary impact that 
investment in intellectual property and aircraft leasing can have on GDFCF, in 
Figure 13 we show modified GDFCF. This measure of investment explicitly excludes 
both of these distortionary items and provides a better gauge of underlying trends 
in national investment.11 During Q2 2020, when the country was in the strictest 
phase of lockdown, modified GDFCF declined by 24.5 per cent compared to the 
same period the previous year. This growth rate picked up significantly in Q3 with 
the year-on-year rate increasing to -4.0 per cent. Over this period, building and 
construction activity declined by 12.1 per cent year-on-year, which was an 
improvement from the 33.8 per cent decline in Q2.  
 
FIGURE 13  MODIFIED GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
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To gain insight into how business confidence has been impacted by the pandemic 
this year, we draw on the European Commission’s Economic Sentiment Indicator. 
This is a weighted composite index which is made up of five sectors; industry 
(40 per cent), services (30 per cent), consumers (20 per cent), retail (5 per cent) 
and construction (5 per cent). Figure 14 shows that the index for Ireland declined 
steeply in March and April as the first lockdown was put in place. As the restrictions 
were gradually rolled back, sentiment began to increase, reaching its highest level 
in September relative to the prior six months. However, the most recent data for 
October indicate that confidence has started to decline again, coinciding with the 
stricter lockdown measures that were put in place during this month. Due to the 
long-term nature of capital expenditure, a decline in sentiment is likely to 
correspond with a decline in investment spending. 
 
FIGURE 14  ECONOMIC SENTIMENT INDICATOR 
 
 
Source:  European Commission.  
 
Figure 15 shows the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for both the manufacturing 
and services sectors. This Index is based on a monthly survey of senior executives 
at private market companies across five fields, namely, supplier deliveries, 
inventories, order backlogs, new orders and employment levels. The indices give 
an indication of underlying business conditions and sentiment in a particular 
sector. An index value over 50 indicates an expansion in the sector relative to the 
previous month, while a value below 50 indicates a contraction.  
 
The steeper decline in the services index relative to manufacturing in Q2 indicates 
that this sector of the economy was more negatively impacted by the initial 
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cent in April relative to February, the index for services declined by 77 per cent. 
The services sector also took longer to recover, with the index not increasing above 
50 until July in comparison to June for the manufacturing sector.  
 
With the re-introduction of stricter lockdown restrictions in September/October, 
it is the services sector which again has fared worse in terms of the PMI. In both 
months, the index has been below 50 indicating a contraction on the previous 
month while the manufacturing sector has maintained expansion. The larger 
impact on the services sector reflects the difficulty for firms in this sector reaching 
their consumers when the administrative closures are in place. In contrast, under 
most phases of the public health restrictions, manufacturing firms can continue to 
produce and sell goods to consumers albeit at a reduced capacity.  
 
FIGURE 15  PURCHASING MANAGERS INDEX 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Housing completions 
In Q3 2020 there were 5,118 new residential completions, a 9.4 per cent decline 
on the same period the previous year. While any decline in housing completions is 
unwelcome given the ongoing issue of undersupply in the market, the scale of the 
decline is significantly less than that experienced in Q2 when the initial lockdown 
restrictions were in place. For six weeks over this period all work on construction 
sites was prohibited as part of the administrative restrictions. As a result, there 
were just 3,247 completions in the country in Q2 2020, a decline of 32.6 per cent 
on the same quarter the previous year. However, the ‘Level 5’ lockdown 
restrictions brought in October deemed construction work as being an essential 
service, with work continuing on residential sites. While construction work can 
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have an adverse impact on housing supply as they likely reduce the level of 
efficiency on construction sites. Given the reduced level of activity throughout the 
year, we now forecast there will be just over 18,500 new completions in 2020. 
 
FIGURE 16  HOUSING COMPLETIONS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
In the event of a vaccine becoming widely available in the country next year it is 
likely that there will be a significant reduction in both unemployment and 
uncertainty. As noted in Allen-Coghlan et al. (2020),12 this may result in significant 
upward pressure on housing demand through the latter part of 2021. While 
changes in the demand side of the housing market are likely to occur quite quickly, 
Allen-Coghlan et al. (2020) argue the impact on the supply side of the market will 
likely take longer to pass through. Initial evidence of this can be observed in the 
residential commencements data (Figure 17) which show that since the initial 
lockdown was brought in in March there has been a marked decline in the number 
of new commencements. Over this period the annual growth rate of residential 
commencements has been in negative territory, with the most recent data for 
August showing the number of new commencements is down by 45 per cent 
relative to the same period the previous year. In light of this slowdown, our 
forecast for the number of new completions has been modified downwards for 
2021 and we now expect there to be 19,600 completions in 2021. 
 
 
                                                            
 
12  Allen-Coghlan, M., K. McQuinn and C. O’Toole (2020). ‘Assessing the impacts of COVID-19 on the Irish property market: 
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FIGURE 17  RESIDENTIAL COMMENCEMENTS 
 
 
Source:   Housing Agency.  
 
In light of the stricter lockdown restrictions that were put in place in October of 
this year, investment activity is expected to decline in Q4 relative to Q3. As a result 
of this and the decline in investment we have seen over the first three quarters of 
the year, total investment for 2020 is expected to fall by 13.6 per cent. Our 
underlying assumption for next year is that public health restrictions will remain in 
place through the first half of the year. This includes the implementation of a strict 
lockdown for six weeks akin to that which was in place over October/November. 
As a result, business sentiment is expected to remain low over the first half of next 
year and a significant number of firms will be forced to cease trading. However, 
our second assumption for next year is that a vaccine will be widely available over 
the second half of 2020 and as a result investment is expected to improve 
dramatically over this latter period. As a result, we expect investment to grow by 
5.8 per cent in 2021. Under a no-deal arrangement between the EU and the UK, 






































































































Residential Units Commenced (LHS) Growth Rate (%, RHS)




• Unemployment rate was 21 per cent in November 2020. 
• Over 352,000 people were claiming the PUP at the end of November.  
• Employers received EWSS payments for approximately 268,600 qualifying 
employees in November.  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a substantial and unprecedented impact on the 
Irish labour market. In November 2020 the COVID-adjusted unemployment rate 
was 21 per cent. The significant fluctuations in the unemployment rate this year 
mainly reflect the impact that the tightening and loosening of public health 
restrictions has had on businesses. The unemployment rate was at its lowest in 
February at 4.9 per cent while it peaked at 30.4 per cent in April, the period in 
which the strictest public health measures were in place. The progressive loosening 
of restrictions over the summer was accompanied by a steady decline in the 
unemployment rate from May to September. In line with the reintroduction of 
more stringent public health restrictions, the unemployment rate increased by 
5.1 percentage points from September (15.9 per cent) to November (21 per cent). 
Figure 18 shows the monthly unemployment rate from January 2016 to November 
2020.  
 
FIGURE 18 UNEMPLOYMENT BY MONTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Seasonally-Adjusted Monthly Unemployment Rate Series and the COVID-19 Adjusted Monthly Unemployment Rate Series. 
Central Statistics Office.  
Note:  The COVID-19 Adjusted Monthly Unemployment rate is used from March 2020 onward, rather than the traditional Monthly 
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Looking at the number of individuals on the Live Register and in receipt of the 
Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) on a weekly basis can provide further 
insight into the impact of the pandemic and the public health measures on the 
number of people without work. The number of individuals in receipt of the PUP 
peaked at just over 600,000 individuals in early May. As the restrictions were eased 
there was a general decline in the number of those in receipt of the PUP between 
the end of May and the beginning of October. The number of those in receipt of 
the PUP fell by 65.9 per cent (396,500 people) between the peak during the week 
ending 3 May and the week ending 4 October. With the return of more stringent 
public health restrictions in late October, the number of those in receipt of the PUP 
increased, and by 24 November approximately 352,100 people were in receipt of 
the payment. It is also interesting to note that 23.3 per cent of those in receipt of 
the PUP in Q3 2020 did not expect to return to the same job, while the remaining 
76.7 per cent expected to or had already returned to the same job.13 Figure 19 
shows the number of individuals in receipt of the PUP or on the Live Register by 
week from March to November. 
 
FIGURE 19 NUMBER OF PEOPLE ON THE PUP AND LIVE REGISTER BY WEEK  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and Department of Social Protection.  
Note:  The initial stay-at-home order came into effect on 28 March. Phase 1 of ‘The Roadmap for Reopening Society and Business’ began 
on 18 May, while Phase 2 and Phase 3 began on 8 June and 29 June respectively. Phase 3 was extended and before Phase 4 was 
implemented the ‘The Roadmap for Reopening Society and Business’ was replaced by the ‘Resilience and Recovery 2020-2021: Plan 
for Living with COVID-19’ on 15 September. The entire country was under Level 2 restrictions initially. A higher level of restrictions 
was subsequently applied in Dublin, Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal before the entire country was moved to Level 5 from midnight 
on 21 October.  
 
Previous Commentaries have documented how some sectors have been more 
adversely affected than others by the pandemic and how the job losses have 
disproportionately affected younger people, and this remains the case. Of those in 
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receipt of the PUP on 24 November, 29.2 per cent were from the Accommodation 
and food sector, 16.3 per cent were from the Wholesale and retail trade/repair of 
motor vehicles sector, and 8.9 per cent were from the Other sector category which 
includes, for example, hairdressers and beauty salon workers. These three sectors 
alone account for 54.3 per cent of those PUP recipients. In terms of age, 22.8 per 
cent of those in receipt of the PUP on 24 November were between 25 and 34 years 
of age with a further 25.5 per cent under 25.  
 
The PUP is no longer paid at the flat rate of €350. There are now four payment 
levels (€350, €300, €250 and €203) based on the amount previously earned. Of 
those in receipt of the PUP on 24 November, 44.9 per cent received €350 while the 
remainder of recipients were relatively equally distributed across the other three 
payment levels. Of those who previously worked in the Accommodation and food 
sector, 57.9 per cent were receiving a PUP payment of less than €350 and this 
highlights the concentration of low paid workers within this sector. Table 2 shows 
the number of people in receipt of the PUP on 24 November broken down by age 
and payment level respectively.  
 
TABLE 2  BREAKDOWN OF PUP RECIPIENTS BY AGE AND PAYMENT LEVEL  
Age (Years) Number (‘000) Percentage  
 Payment (€) Number (‘000) Percentage  
<25 89.7 25.5  350 158.2 44.9 
25-34 80.4 22.8  300 64.5 18.3 
35-44 76.4 21.7  250 64.2 18.2 
45-54 60.2 17.1  203 65.3 18.6 
55+ 45.4 12.9  Total  352.1 100.0 
Total  352.1 100.0     
 
Note:  Figures refer to those in receipt of the PUP on 24 November 2020.  
Source:  Payments Awarded for COVID-19 Pandemic Unemployment Payment and Enhanced Illness Benefit – Statistics. Published on 
23 November by Department of Social Protection.  
 
Naturally, the level and composition of those employed has also been affected. 
According to the Labour Force Survey there were an estimated 2,289,000 people 
at work in Q3 2020. This figure may not represent the full impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on the Irish labour market as it has been determined using strict 
classification criteria set by the ILO. To address this problem, a COVID-19 adjusted 
estimate of employment has been produced. The CSO estimates that 2,078,058 
persons aged 15 and over were in employment in September 2020 (the end of 
Q3).14 This figure represents a fall of 10.4 per cent when compared to the level of 
employment in Q3 2019 but is 16.5 per cent higher than the COVID-adjusted level 
 
                                                            
 
14  For more information see: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/lfs/labourforcesurveylfsquarter32020.  
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of employment at the end of Q2 in June (1,783,567 persons). The CSO has also 
produced a COVID-adjusted level of employment for October 2020 – 1,965,209 
persons. This is 5.4 per cent lower that than the level in September and reflects the 
increase in the number of people being supported by the Pandemic 
Unemployment Payment.  
 
Many of those still working are being supported by a wage subsidy scheme. These 
schemes allow employees, whose employers were negatively impacted by the 
pandemic, to be supported directly through their employer’s payroll system. The 
Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) ran from 26 March 2020 to 31 August 
2020. An estimated 360,000 employees were being directly supported by the 
scheme when it closed in August. The total cost to the Exchequer of operating the 
TWSS for its duration was approximately €2.8 billion (Revenue Commissioners, 
2020). The Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme (EWSS) replaced the TWSS from 
1 September 2020 although the TWSS and the EWSS operated in parallel 
throughout July and August. The EWSS provides a flat-rate subsidy to qualifying 
employers based on the number of eligible employees on their payroll. The scheme 
was expected to run until 31 March of next year, but the Government has 
announced that supports to employers will continue until the end of 2021 
(Revenue Commissioners, 2020).15  
 
While the TWSS was active, approximately 125,100 people regained employment 
and transitioned from the PUP to the TWSS. Approximately 23,200 individuals 
supported by the TWSS lost their jobs and transitioned from the scheme to the 
PUP. Approximately 242,400 individuals moved from the TWSS to non-TWSS 
employment.16 This shows the significant role the wage subsidy scheme has played 
in helping individuals retain/regain their jobs during the pandemic. Approximately 
221,200 employees that were on the TWSS in August were on the EWSS in October. 
EWSS payments were made for 348,400 eligible employees in October and 268,600 
eligible employees in November. This fall is largely explained by the fact that 
approximately 75,100 employees who were on the EWSS in October appeared on 
the PUP in November. Figure 20 shows the number of individuals on the TWSS from 
March to August and the number of qualifying employees for whom the employer 
received an EWSS payment thereafter. An analysis of the fiscal cost of these 
measures is contained in a Special Article to this analysis (Doorley et al., 2020).  
 
 
                                                            
 
15  Revenue Commissioners (2020). Covid-19 Support Schemes – Preliminary Statistics, Published on 3 December. Available 
at: https://revenue.ie/en/corporate/information-about-revenue/statistics/number-of-taxpayers-and-returns/covid-
19-wage-subsidy-scheme-statistics.aspx.  
16  For more details see: https://revenue.ie/en/corporate/information-about-revenue/statistics/number-of-taxpayers-
and-returns/covid-19-wage-subsidy-scheme-statistics.aspx.  
28|  Q ua rte r ly  Econ om ic  Com me nta ry  –  Win te r  2020  
 
FIGURE 20  NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES ON WAGE SUBSIDY SCHEMES BY MONTH 
 
Source:  Revenue Commissioners. 
Note:  EWSS back payments for 30,700 employees were made with reference to the months of July and August combined but they are 
not included on the graph above. 
 
We expect the unemployment rate to be 20 per cent in Q4 2020. For 2020 as a 
whole, we expect the unemployment rate will average 18.4 per cent. This 
demonstrates the scale of the economic shock faced by the Irish labour market due 
to the pandemic. Under our Baseline scenario for 2021, which assumes a trade deal 
is agreed between the EU and the UK and that a vaccine is available in Ireland for 
the second half of 2021, we estimate the unemployment rate will be just under 
10 per cent in Q4 2021 with the rate averaging 14.5 per cent for the whole of 2021. 
Under a no-deal outcome between the EU and the UK, the unemployment rate 



























































• A substantial deficit in 2020. 
• A significant deficit also in 2021, even with a vaccine rolled out. 
• Higher debt levels are sustainable over the medium term once budgetary 
discipline is maintained. 
 
Figure 21 plots the growth rates for the main taxation items for the period January 
to November of each year from 2016 to 2020.  
 
FIGURE 21 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS (%): JANUARY – NOVEMBER 
 
 
Source: Department of Finance.  
 
With the exception of stamp duties and corporation taxes, all taxation items 
observed a decline for the year to date compared with 2019. Stamp duties 
registered a strong increase for the present year mainly due to an allocation of 
€580 million from ‘an ongoing complex tax issue’.17 Income tax receipts, which did 
appear to be holding up reasonably well in the face of the significant increase in 
unemployment, are now down by nearly 8 per cent when compared with the 
previous year’s level. However, the filing deadline for income tax has been 
deferred to December so it is probably prudent not to read too much into the 
November returns. Overall, total taxation receipts are down by 7.2 per cent over 
the same period. 
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The impact of the changes in the labour market can also be observed in the PRSI 
returns. For the year to November, receipts are down by over €1 billion or 9.7 per 
cent compared with 2019. The rate of decline is greater than the fall in income tax 
receipts as PRSI is less progressive and captures more of the impact of the job 
losses.  
 
For the year to date, corporation tax receipts are up by nearly 7 per cent. This 
constitutes another large increase in the receipts on the back of sustained rises 
since 2013. In the present year, some of this increase may be related to the 
pandemic as a number of Irish-based corporations have benefitted from increases 
in medicinal and pharmaceutical exports. However, more generally over the past 
few years, some of the increase in corporation receipts has been linked more to 
taxation related issues than the underlying profitability of the corporate sector. In 
Box A, the potential implications for Irish corporation tax receipts of the new 
political administration in the United States are discussed.  
 
BOX A ADMINISTRATION CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND FUTURE IRISH 
CORPORATION TAX RECEIPTS? 
The change of political administration in the United States is likely to have a significant 
impact on the Irish economy in the forthcoming years. The likelihood of re-engagement by 
the United States in international efforts on issues such as climate change and the 
recognised position of the incoming administration to Brexit are clear positives for the Irish 
economy going forward. Furthermore, any improvements in globalisation and 
enhancements to international trade which transpire are positive for the Irish economy. 
 
However, it is worth noting that certain changes in the treatment of corporation tax by the 
outgoing administration may help explain a significant increase in corporation receipts for 
the Irish Exchequer.  
 
Irish corporation tax receipts have registered significant growth over the past six years with 
actual returns outstripping the forecasted18 levels on a consistent basis. The difference 
between the actual and forecast levels are apparent in Figure A; the difference is labelled 
‘windfall’ and the forecast error (the windfall/actual return) is also plotted. In total, since 
2014, actual receipts have been over €7 billion greater than the forecast level representing 
a significant taxation windfall over the period for the Irish Exchequer. This sustained 
increase has prompted a number of commentators, including McQuinn, O’Toole, Allen-
Coghlan and Coffey (2019),19 to raise questions about the sustainability or otherwise of 
Irish corporation receipts. 
 
                                                            
 
18  Each year the Department of Finance publishes its ‘profile’ or forecast of individual tax headings for the year ahead. 
These can be observed on a historical basis in http://databank.finance.gov.ie.  
19  In particular, see the Box by Varthalitis p.56. 
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FIGURE A  DIFFERENCE (€ BILLION) BETWEEN ACTUAL AND FORECAST LEVEL OF CORPORATION 
TAX RECEIPTS AND FORECAST ERROR (%) 
 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
 
In its 2017 taxation reform legislation, the outgoing US administration heralded a 
movement towards a territorial based corporation tax system. In general, a 
territorial based approach results in the US administration not taxing the profits of 
US companies earned in a foreign country. Under the approach, the profits are taxed 
by that foreign country at the prevailing rate. However, as was generally recognised 
at the time, this territorial approach risked incentivising US companies to move 
enterprises to a low corporation tax country such as Switzerland, for example, 
where the enterprises could pay an even lower effective rate. To counter this 
outcome, the 2017 legislation also introduced the GILTI (Global Intangible Low-
taxed Income) which is defined as the excess income earned by a company’s foreign 
subsidiaries over and above a 10 per cent rate of return on their tangible business 
assets. If no foreign tax is paid on the foreign pool of GILTI profits, the US imposes 
an effective tax rate of 10.5 per cent on these. This was meant to safeguard against 
US multinationals outsourcing activity to subsidiaries in other countries. 
 
While some commentators initially felt that the 2017 US tax reform would have an 
adverse effect on Irish taxation revenues, Barry (2019) concluded that they were 
unlikely to have such an impact. Furthermore, Setser (2018; 2019), Pozen (2017) and 
Clausing (2020) argued that at 10.5 per cent the GILTI was too low and that the 2017 
tax reforms would actually still incentivise multinational activity to be outsourced 
from the US to countries which had relatively low corporation tax rates, especially 
where US subsidiaries already had a significant presence. Any extra outsourcing of 
such activity to an Irish subsidiary would result in greater corporation tax receipts 
accruing to the Irish Exchequer. Amongst the evidence presented for this is the 
continued increase in the level of trade in pharmaceutical products between Ireland 















2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Windfall Forecast Error (RHS)




The significant presence of US technology and pharmaceutical companies in Ireland 
may have been one of the reasons for the significant increase in corporation tax 
receipts observed in the domestic economy in recent years. Consequently, any 
changes to this legislation which sees a movement away from the territorial 
approach or witnesses an increase in the GILTI tax rate may result in lower domestic 
corporation tax increases for the Irish Exchequer in the future. As noted in McQuinn, 
O’Toole, Allen-Coghlan and Coffey (2019), this underscores the potential 
vulnerability of future corporation tax receipts and suggests that any windfall 
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This Box was prepared by Kieran McQuinn  
 
For 2020, the increased expenditure in areas such as social protection and health, 
along with the overall decline in taxation revenues, means that the Exchequer is 
likely to experience a deficit of €22.6 billion or 6.2 per cent of GDP. This will result 
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in a significant increase in the national debt. In 2021, under our baseline scenario 
we assume that the Government continues to provide the income support 
schemes for the duration of the year. Consequently, government expenditure is 
higher than would otherwise be the case. We do expect to see most of the taxation 
headings registering positive growth in 2021 as receipts recover in line with 
economic activity. However, as can be seen from Table 3, which presents the actual 
level of taxation receipts for 2019 as well as forecasts for 2020 and 2021, we 
believe that most tax aggregates will be lower in level terms in 2021 than they were 
in 2019. Overall, in 2021, we forecast the deficit will be €18.5 billion in 2021 or 
4.6 per cent of GDP. 
 
TABLE 3 FORECAST OF KEY TAXATION AGGREGATES IN 2021 (€ BILLION) 
Tax Heading 2019 actual level  (€ billion) 
2020 forecast growth 
(%) 
2021 forecast growth 
(%) 
Income 22.9 -4 4 
VAT 15.1 -22 42 
Corporation 10.9 6 0 
Excise 5.9 -15 15 
Total 59.3 -8 13 
 
Source:  Department of Finance and Authors’ Calculations. 
 
Figure 22 plots the forecast General Government Balance for 2020 for a select set 
of European countries. Notwithstanding the fact that Ireland had arguably one of 
the most restrictive set of public health restrictions across Europe, the domestic 
general balance, in terms of GDP, is set to be one of the smallest for the year. 
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From a sovereign funding perspective, the National Treasury Management Agency 
(NTMA) aims to use existing cash balances to meet part of the additional 2020 
funding requirement. It is also intended that short-term paper will be an important 
funding source for the sovereign. The agency also expects that the ECB’s Pandemic 
Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) along with its pre-COVID programme the 
Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) will continue to underpin the Irish bond 
market. The PEPP is particularly important in that regard given its size 
(approximately €1.35 trillion). In a Special Article in this Commentary Allen-
Coghlan, McQuinn and Varthalitis (2020) examine the impact of a scenario where 
an EU Member State is able to finance part of its emerging deficit via less costly 
ECB bond holdings. This mitigates the negative effect of the virus-related shock on 
the domestic economy. 
 
We summarise the resulting implications for our forecasts of the debt-to-output 
ratios in Figure 23. By the end of 2020, we believe the debt-to-GDP ratio will be up 
to 63 per cent while debt-to-GNI* will have increased to almost 103 per cent. In 
2019, the debt-to-GNI* ratio had fallen to 95 per cent. Both ratios will decline 
marginally in 2021 as the recovery in output will exceed the increase in the national 
debt.  
 
FIGURE 23 DEBT-TO-GDP AND DEBT-TO-GNI*RATIOS (%) 
 
 
Sources:  QEC calculations. 
Given the increase in the level of national debt, Box B by Allen-Coghlan and 
McQuinn examines the potential sustainability of this debt under plausible future 
growth scenarios for the economy. In particular, the Box utilises the growth 
scenarios examined in a Box in the previous Commentary by Bergin and García-
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medium term and the interest rate on the Irish debt levels remains at its present 
rate, then the higher levels of debt are sustainable. 
 
BOX B DEBT SUSTAINABILI TY ANALYSIS FOR THE IRISH ECONOMY 
As a result of the accommodative monetary policy stance of the ECB and strong demand 
amongst international investors for the sovereign debt of European countries, the yields 
on Irish government bonds have decreased substantially in the last decade. Figure B shows 
the sovereign bond yields on ten-year Irish government debt over the past ten years.  
 
FIGURE B  IRISH SOVEREIGN BOND YIELDS: TEN-YEAR GOVERNMENT DEBT 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
 
The ability of the Irish Government to issue new debt at record low yields has resulted in 
a significant reduction in the effective interest rates on outstanding government debt. This, 
combined with the mild surpluses the Exchequer has run over the last couple of years, has 
helped to reduce the overall public debt levels in the country.20  
 
However, given the impact of COVID-19, as with most European countries, the domestic 
government is set to run a significant deficit in 2020 and 2021. This is due to a combination 
of increased expenditure to combat the negative shock of the pandemic and the decreased 
taxation revenue from reduced economic activity. This will result in a substantial increase 
in the level of public debt, forecast to 63 per cent of GDP in 2020.  
 
Naturally such a significant rise in public debt gives rise to questions around the 
sustainability of that debt. According to the IMF ‘a country’s public debt is considered 
sustainable if the government is able to meet all its current and future payment obligations 
without exceptional financial assistance or going into default’. In this Box we explore the 
sustainability of Irish government debt depending on future post-COVID-19 economic 
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growth rates in the country and developments in the interest rate on Irish government 
debt.  
 
In order to measure the sustainability of Irish debt we use the common debt accumulation 




 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 
where ∆𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡  is the change in the gross government debt-to-GDP ratio, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the interest rate 
charged on government debt, 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 is the nominal GDP growth rate in the country, 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 is the 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio and 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 is the deficit-debt adjustment as a share of GDP.22 
 
The growth rate 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 we use comes from a Box in the previous Commentary by Bergin and 
García-Rodríguez. In this Box the authors used the COSMO macro-econometric model of 
the Irish economy to explore the potential impact that COVID-19 would have on the Irish 
economy over the long run.  
 
They put forward three different scenarios for the impact of the pandemic on the economy 
over the next ten years, namely the Recovery scenario, the Delayed Recovery scenario and 
the Second Wave scenario.23 These three scenarios were all relative to a baseline case of 
a no-pandemic scenario. In this analysis we apply each of these output scenarios to the 
above equation while also introducing two scenarios for interest rate developments over 
the next ten years. In all cases we make the assumption that the primary balance after 
2021 returns to zero. Of course, any primary balance deficit over this period would 
increase the debt-to-GDP ratio and a primary balance surplus would decrease the ratio. 
We also assume that the deficit adjustment ratio is zero over this period which is a 
common assumption for this type of analysis. 
 
In our first interest rate scenario we keep the interest rate constant at the rate observed 
for 2020 of 1.9 per cent. For every year thereafter we applied this interest rate to 
Equation 1. Combining this with the growth rates from the four COSMO scenarios (the 
three COVID scenarios and the baseline) we get the path of the debt-to-GDP ratio over the 
next ten years (Figure C). Under this interest rate scenario, the debt dynamics are shown 
to be improving or remaining stable under all output scenarios. Even in the delayed 
recovery scenario, which has the largest adverse shock to long-run output, the estimated 
debt-to-GDP ratio remains stable. Under the recovery scenario the debt-to-GDP ratio 
declines back below 60 per cent by 2029, the level it was pre-pandemic. 
 
 
                                                            
 
21  See for example: Bouabdallah, O., C. Checherita-Westphal, F. Drudi, R. Setzer, R. De Stefani, T. Warmedinger and 
A. Westphal (2017). ‘Debt sustainability analysis for euro area sovereigns: a methodological framework,’ Occasional 
Paper Series 185, European Central Bank. 
22  The 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 is the difference between the change in debt and the deficit in any given period. 
23  For more see Bergin A., A. Garcia Rodriguez, L. Rehill and É. Sweeney (2020). ‘Exploring the Impacts of Covid-19, A Hard 
Brexit and Recovery Paths for the Economy’, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn 2020 (ESRI). 
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FIGURE C  DEBT-TO-GDP RATIO: LOW INTEREST RATE 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
In the second interest rate scenario we estimate what the debt-to-GDP ratios might look 
like if there is a gradual increase in the interest rate over the next ten years. This could 
occur if the ECB were to roll back some of the accommodative monetary policy measures 
it has put in place in recent years which it could consider doing if, for example, inflation 
rates across the Eurozone began to pick up. Over the ten years to 2030 we grow the 
interest rate to the average rate it was over the previous ten years i.e. 3.3 per cent. Under 
both the Baseline and the Recovery scenarios the debt dynamics are shown to remain 
favourable with the debt-to-GDP ratios still decreasing. This shows that even under a 
scenario where interest rates were to grow over the next decade the growth rate under 
the Recovery scenario is strong enough to ensure that the debt-to-GDP level would 
decrease. However, this is not the case for the Delayed Recovery and Second Wave 
scenario in which the growth rates are not high enough to offset the rising interest rate. In 
the Delayed Recovery scenario, in particular, the debt-to-GDP ratio is shown to be 
increasing over the next ten years, showing that the forecast GDP growth would not be 
enough to offset the impact of the increase in the interest rate over this period. 
FIGURE D  DEBT-TO-GDP RATIO: GRADUAL INCREASE IN THE INTEREST RATE  
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As a result of the continuing negative impact of the pandemic on economies across the 
Euro Area, the ECB is unlikely to reverse its dovish monetary policy stance in the near 
future. However, as economies begin to recover after COVID-19 the ECB may begin to roll 
back some of its accommodative policy measures. One of the consequences of this would 
be a higher interest rate on Irish government debt. If this were to happen while Irish 
growth rates remained anaemic then, as the previous graphs have shown, there would be 
an increased risk of Irish debt becoming unsustainable. However, looking at historical 
growth rates for the country it seems the Irish economy is well poised for positive growth 
when the pandemic is brought under control. Figure E shows that before the pandemic the 
average growth rates of the Irish economy were amongst the highest in the EU. 
 
FIGURE E  TEN-YEAR AVERAGE GROWTH RATES (X-AXIS) AND DEBT-TO-GDP IN THE EU (Y-AXIS) 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
Conclusions 
The large deficits that the Government will run this year and next will lead to significant 
increases in the level of Irish public debt. The extent to which this public debt will be 
sustainable going forward is largely dependent on the future growth path of the Irish 
economy and the extent to which interest rates remain at their current low rates. The 
growth path of the Irish economy over the next ten years will be impacted by the 
pandemic. This analysis has shown that in the event of a sharp recovery in the Irish 
economy, the growth rate would likely be large enough to counter even a steady increase 
in the interest rate over the next ten years resulting in improving debt dynamics over this 
period. However, in the event of a delayed recovery or a second wave of the virus the debt 
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Currently all economies across the Euro Area are feeling the negative impacts of the 
pandemic. This makes it more likely that ECB monetary policy will be in line with the needs 
of the Irish economy going forward. Indeed, given the relatively strong growth rates 
experienced by the Irish economy compared to most other Euro Area countries over the 
past ten years, Irish growth rates are likely to continue to exceed the Euro Area average 
over the medium term.  
 
This Box was prepared by Kieran McQuinn and Matthew Allen-Coghlan 
  




COVID-19 has resulted in an unprecedented level of intra-year volatility in most 
Western economies. This is particularly the case in the Irish context, given the 
exceptionally strong pace of growth experienced by the domestic economy prior 
to the pandemic. The decision by the national authorities to place the country in a 
general lockdown in Q2 2020 resulted in a dramatic decline in most sources of 
growth for the domestic economy with consumption and investment falling in a 
substantial manner. However, Q3 2020 has seen a significant recovery in domestic 
demand, while export growth, which had remained positive even when restrictions 
were tightest, now appears to be strengthening further. The re-imposition of tight 
public health restrictions in Q4 2020 will inevitably moderate the degree of the 
economic recovery; however it is increasingly clear that the second lockdown will 
not have the same negative impact on growth that the first one did. 
 
Overall, we believe the Irish economy will grow by 3.4 per cent in the present year. 
This seemingly surprising result is due to the relatively strong performance of the 
export sector through the present year. As noted in the previous Commentary 
much of this resilience is due to the concentration of Irish exports in seemingly 
pandemic-proof sectors such as pharmaceuticals and computer services activities 
(O’Toole, 2020). However, there is also some evidence to suggest in Q3 2020 that 
the export performance is becoming more broad based. 
 
While a positive growth rate in the current year is an exceptional outcome, it is 
clear that COVID-19 has had and will continue to have a highly detrimental impact 
on the Irish economy and society at large. The unemployment rate, which had been 
declining following the lifting of the first general lockdown, is now increasing in 
Q4 2020 and is set to be 20 per cent by the end of the year.  
 
The higher rate of unemployment also results in higher levels of Government 
expenditure with the Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP), for example, 
witnessing further increases over Q4. As a result, we now believe the Irish State 
will have a General Government deficit of €22.6 billion or 6.2 per cent of GDP in 
the present year. In recent times, this scale of deficit was only observed at the 
height of the financial crisis. 
 
The relaxation of Level 5 measures for the Christmas period in Q4 2020 has 
influenced our choice of scenario for 2021. Given the possibility of an increase in 
the presence of the virus following the easing of Government restrictions, we now 
assume that there will be another six-week Level 5 lockdown in the first half of 
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2021. However, in Q3 2020 we now assume the roll-out of a vaccine to the general 
population which will continue through Q4 2021. The adoption of a vaccine 
scenario reflects the increased optimism of a vaccine becoming readily available 
following positive news around its testing and development in November 2020. 
 
As a result, in our baseline scenario GDP is expected to increase in 2021 by 4.9 per 
cent, with unemployment averaging 14.5 per cent for the year. The presence or 
otherwise of a vaccine and the speed and efficiency with which one is rolled out to 
the general public will have major implications for the short- and medium-term 
outlook for the domestic economy. 
 
All of these results are subject to the assumption that a trade deal is achieved 
between the United Kingdom and the European Union. However, if a deal is not 
achieved, then our growth rate forecast for GDP is reduced to 1.5 per cent. 
 
Even with a vaccine and robust recovery in 2021, the overall implications for the 
public finances are still quite severe with the Government expected to run a deficit 
of 4.8 per cent or €18.5 billion. Given the ongoing costs of the pandemic for the 
Irish Exchequer, the Commentary devotes a certain degree of attention to fiscal 
related items. In a Box, Allen-Coghlan and McQuinn assess the likely implications 
of different recovery paths of the domestic economy on the sustainability of Irish 
sovereign debt levels. Following work by Bergin et al. in the Autumn Commentary, 
Allen-Coghlan and McQuinn find that, if the future average interest rate on Irish 
debt remains constant over the next ten years, then future higher debt levels will 
be sustainable. However, were the interest rate to increase, then the debt 
dynamics would not be as reassuring. The analysis does assume that the Irish State 
does not run a negative primary balance from 2022 onwards. A second Box by 
McQuinn discusses the potential implications for Irish corporation tax receipts of 
the change in the political administration in the United States. The Box cautions 
against the use of ‘windfall’ corporation tax receipts in funding increases in current 
Government expenditure. 
 
A Special Article in this Commentary by Allen-Coghlan, McQuinn and Varthalitis 
(2020), examines the role EU institutions and the European Central Bank (ECB), in 
particular, can play in mitigating the negative economic and fiscal effects of the 
COVID-19 crisis. They conduct a policy experiment where a Member State is able 
to finance part of its emerging deficit via less costly ECB bond holdings. This results 
in extra fiscal space for the domestic authorities in the short and medium run and 
mitigates the negative effect of the virus-related shock on consumption and 
investment. This reduces the subsequent increase in the deficit and public debt 
than would otherwise be the case.  
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Both the analysis in the Boxes and the Special Article highlight the importance of 
the ongoing support of the ECB in the present crisis and further highlights the stark 
economic and fiscal consequences of a reduction in that support. Schnabel (2020)24 
provides the context for ECB monetary policy at this time and addresses some of 
the criticisms which have arisen due to the unprecedented nature of the ECB 
intervention. These include refuting the allegation that the unconventional policy 
measures have muted market discipline and arguing that fiscal policy support is 
more important now as a tool of macroeconomic stabilisation given the long-term 
decline in the real natural interest rate. It is worth noting that the present 
accommodative stance of the ECB is significantly different from the policy stance 
adopted by the ECB at the onset of the financial crisis.  
 
Following on this theme, Allen-Coghlan and Varthalitis (2020), in a Research Note 
in the Commentary, compare the similarities and differences between the financial 
crisis and the current one. They look at key economic indicators across both 
periods and assess the rapidity and the magnitude of the shock caused by each 
crisis. They find that the scale of the negative shock for most key indicators is much 
more severe during the COVID-19 crisis. However, the recovery also seems to be 
sharper than during the global financial crisis where the downward movement was 
gradual and more prolonged. 
 
The Commentary also contains a Special Article by Doorley et al. (2020) which 
conducts a distributional assessment of poverty and inequality measures in budget 
2021 on Irish households. The analysis concludes that while COVID-related 
unemployment payments are costly to the Exchequer, the existing tax-benefit 
system accounts for at least half of the cost. Overall, Doorley et al. (2020) conclude 
that the policy response to the crisis has sheltered the lowest income groups and 
Budget 2021 continued this trend. The paper discusses future policy challenges in 
respect of the pandemic; for example, it argues that withdrawing the PUP would 
improve financial incentives in the second half of 2021 if sufficient employment 
prospects exist at the time. In terms of the EWSS, the paper recommends that any 
reform of the scheme should be informed by close monitoring of the speed and 
scale of the recovery by individual sectors of the economy. It also recommends that 
the design of the subsidy be examined. At present, the sharp cut-off in eligibility 
imposed by the requirement to be experiencing a 30 per cent reduction in turnover 
means some firms may face an incentive to suppress output, therefore inhibiting 
their recovery. 
 
                                                            
 
24  Schnabel I. (2020). The shadow of fiscal dominance: Misconceptions, perceptions and perspectives. Schnabel is a 
member of the executive board of the ECB. Speech available at:  
 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp200911~ea32bd8bb3.en.html. 
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While the export sector has performed exceptionally well, the record contraction 
in the domestic economy and the ongoing public health restrictions have had a 
very severe impact on many domestic sectors. Indeed, recent survey data indicate 
the number of firms reporting profitability has dropped by nearly 30 percentage 
points (to 60 per cent) since the crisis.25 Despite this shock, the number of firms 
facing insolvency has not yet begun to increase (McGeever et al., 2020), in the main 
due to the extraordinary policy supports (such as the wage subsidy scheme, new 
credit guarantees and tax measures), extensive forbearance on debt, tax and other 
payments and the use of internal resources. With the deployment of a widescale 
vaccine in mid to late 2021, other public health restrictions which have affected 
the SME sector are likely to be loosened. Coupled with a recovery in household 
spending, this should provide some respite for struggling domestic enterprises. 
However, at the same time, some of the emergency policy supports are likely to be 
removed and 2021 may see a rise in company insolvencies which were delayed 
from 2020. While policy measures will need to continue in line with public health 
restrictions, the orientation of these measures may need to change from 
emergency support to boosting growth and recovery when these measures lapse. 
In this case, ensuring that surviving firms have adequate credit to invest will 
become critically important to improve their long-term productivity.  
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DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF TAX AND WELFARE POLICIES: COVID-
RELATED POLICIES AND BUDGET 2021
 
*Karina Doorley, Claire Keane, Alyvia McTague, Seamus O’Malley, 
Mark Regan, Barra Roantree, Dora Tuda1 
ABSTRACT 
In this article, we assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on unemployment 
in Ireland and estimate how family incomes have changed as a result of increased 
unemployment, calibrated to administrative sources for end-August. We then 
show how the direct and indirect tax and welfare measures enacted prior to 
Budget 2021 have helped to cushion pandemic-related income losses. Lastly, we 
assess the impact of Budget 2021 measures.  
 
We find that pandemic-related unemployment could have decreased household 
income by an average of 7 per cent across the population, with significantly larger 
losses for those who lost their jobs. Thanks to the initial policy response in the form 
of the PUP, wage subsidy and standard rate VAT cut, household income fell instead 
by 3 per cent on average. These losses are sharpest at the upper end of the income 
distribution, for the young, and for those in certain hard-hit sectors such as 
hospitality. The impact of Budget 2021, while less costly than the pre-budget 
measures, is similar in pattern, with above average gains for the bottom two-fifths 
of the income distribution and lower than average gains for those at the upper end.  
 
Without these interventions, income inequality would have increased 
substantially. Instead, our simulations suggest that the COVID-related 
interventions stabilised disposable income inequality, a significant feat given the 
job losses experienced. At risk of poverty rates were also stabilised by COVID-
related policies but there is a risk that these indices may increase significantly once 
these supports are withdrawn. We conclude with some brief reflections on some 
of the challenges facing the government in the coming years. 
 
 
                                                            
 
*  The authors are researchers at the ESRI. Corresponding author: claire.keane@esri.ie. 
1  Funding from the ESRI’s Tax, Welfare and Pensions Research Programme (supported by the Departments of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, Employment Affairs and Social Protection, Health, Children and Youth Affairs and Finance) is 
gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to the CSO for facilitating access to the Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC) Research Microdata File used to construct the database for the SWITCH tax-benefit model and to the 
Irish Social Science Data Archive for facilitating access to the Household Budget Survey used in the ITSim model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the Budget delivered to the Dáil on 13 October, the Minister for Finance and the 
Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform announced plans for General 
Government expenditure in 2021 of €109.2 billion, a €21.9 billion (25 per cent) 
increase from its pre-pandemic 2019 level. This is to be financed by €88.7 billion of 
General Government revenue and borrowing, with a General Government deficit 
of €20.5 billion planned for 2021.2 
 
The majority of additional Departmental expenditure has been allocated to the 
Department of Health – reflecting increased healthcare costs and additional 
demands arising from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic – and the Department of 
Social Protection. While most of the latter reflects increased claims for welfare 
payments rather than an increase in the generosity of these payments, the Budget 
announced changes that will leave welfare spending €510 million higher and taxes 
€265 million lower than they otherwise would have been.3 
 
These measures come in addition to the substantial changes made earlier in 2020 
to the direct tax and benefit system and indirect taxes. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has resulted in huge employment losses in 2020, with the Government responding 
by introducing two new financial supports: the Pandemic Unemployment Payment 
and the Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme. A cut to the standard rate of VAT was 
also enacted in advance of the Budget package.  
 
Using representative survey data linked to SWITCH, the ESRI’s tax and benefit 
microsimulation model and ITSim, the ESRI and Department of Finance indirect tax 
tool, this article assesses these reforms. We first look at the cost and distributional 
effect of pandemic-related unemployment, where this is calibrated to the latest 
available figures at end-August 2020. We then assess how pre-budget COVID 
income supports and Budget 2021 affect these.4  
 
We find that pandemic-related unemployment could have decreased household 
income by an average of 7 per cent across the population, with significantly larger 
losses for those who lost their jobs. Thanks to the initial policy response in the form 
of the PUP, wage subsidy and standard rate VAT cut, household income fell instead 
by 3 per cent on average. These losses are sharpest at the upper end of the income 
 
                                                            
 
2  See Table 11 of the Budget 2021 Economic and Fiscal Outlook, available at http://budget.gov.ie.  
3  See Chapter 10 of Budget 2021 Expenditure Report, available at http://budget.gov.ie.  
4  This analysis focuses on pre-budget direct and indirect tax and welfare measures and Budget 2021. It excludes 
measures announced at the end of October 2020 which increased the level of PUP and EWSS in response to the 
introduction of Level 5 restrictions.  
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distribution, for the young, and for those in certain hard-hit sectors such as 
hospitality. The impact of Budget 2021, while less costly than the pre-budget 
measures, is similar in pattern, with above average gains for the bottom two-fifths 
of the income distribution and lower than average gains for those at the upper end.  
 
Without these interventions, income inequality would have increased 
substantially. Instead, our simulations suggest that the COVID-related 
interventions stabilised disposable income inequality, a significant feat given the 
job losses experienced. At risk of poverty rates were also stabilised by COVID-
related policies but there is a risk that these indices may increase significantly once 
these supports are withdrawn. We conclude with some brief reflections on some 
of the challenges facing the government in the coming years. 
 
2. SCENARIOS 
This analysis uses SWITCH, the ESRI’s tax benefit model and ITSim, the indirect tax 
microsimulation tool jointly developed by researchers at the ESRI and the 
Department of Finance. SWITCH is run on data from the 2017 Survey of Income 
and Living Conditions (SILC), the primary source of information on household 
incomes collected annually by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The scale, depth 
and diversity of this survey allows it to provide an overall picture of the impact of 
the policy changes on Irish households, which cannot be gained from selected 
example cases. ITSim estimates the indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties, including 
carbon taxes) paid by Irish households on the basis of their reported expenditure, 
collected by the CSO’s nationally representative Household Budget Survey (HBS) in 
2015-2016.5 There are three stages to our analysis which rely on four scenarios. 
These are summarised in Table 1.  
 
 
                                                            
 
5  Incomes are uprated to 2020 levels using earnings growth, and expenditures are uprated to 2021 levels using forecasts 
for HICP from the Central Bank of Ireland (Central Bank of Ireland, 2020). No income growth is assumed between 2020 
and 2021. 
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TABLE 1  SCENARIOS 
Scenario Data Tax-benefit policy system 
Pre-COVID 2017 SILC with incomes uprated to 2020 
levels 
February 2020 direct and indirect tax and 
welfare policies, indexed by forecast price 
growth between 2020 and 2021 
COVID - no policy 
response 
2017 SILC with incomes uprated to 2020 
levels and COVID-related job loss 
calibrated to end-August 2020  
February 2020 direct and indirect tax and 
welfare policies, indexed by forecast price 




2017 SILC with incomes uprated to 2020 
levels and COVID-related job loss 
calibrated to end-August 2020 
September 2020 direct and indirect tax and 
welfare policies, indexed by forecast price 
growth between 2020 and 2021 
COVID - Budget 
2021 
2017 SILC with incomes uprated to 2020 
levels and COVID-related job loss 
calibrated to end-August 2020 




Given the substantial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment, we first 
adjust the 2017 data in order to be representative of the 2020 population in terms 
of unemployment rates. A proportion of workers in each industry are assumed to 
have either lost their job or to have been put on the Employment Wage Subsidy 
Scheme (EWSS). The number of individuals to either lose their job or receive the 
EWSS is calibrated from publicly available data from the CSO on the number of 
people in receipt of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) and the 
Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS, the predecessor to EWSS). Both 
calibrations are done using end-August figures, the latest available at the time of 
writing, and account for the industry and age breakdown of recipients of either 
scheme.6 The data are also adjusted to take account of income growth between 
2017 and 2020.7  
 
We then use SWITCH to calculate households’ social welfare entitlements, tax 
liabilities and net incomes under our baseline policy. This indexes the policy rules 
in place in February 2020 by forecast inflation of 0.2 per cent8 between 2020 and 
2021 to provide a benchmark that holds welfare payments, tax credits and 
thresholds constant in real terms.9 Comparing this scenario (COVID – no policy 
response) to one in which there is no unemployment shock (Pre-COVID) shows in 
net-terms the effect of pandemic-related unemployment on incomes, accounting 
 
                                                            
 
6  COVID-19 Adjusted Monthly Unemployment Estimates by Age Group, Lower and Upper Bound, Month, Statistic and 
Sex. https://statbank.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/Statire/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?maintable=MUM02&PLanguage=0. 
7  For example employment income is uprated by 1.12 using data from the CSO and the ESRI Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, and self-employment income is uprated by 1.04 using both data from the CSO and national income 
forecasts in the ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary.  
8  As per the Central Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin, Q3. 
9  While these rules could alternatively be indexed by forecast wage growth to provide a more distributionally neutral 
benchmark, no such forecast was available given the uncertainty associated with the ongoing pandemic. See Callan et 
al. (2019) for a discussion of indexation options and the associated issues they raise. 
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for the offsetting effect of lower tax payments and higher social welfare 
entitlements (so called ‘automatic stabilisers’).  
 
In the second stage, we incorporate three major policy changes made between 
March and September 2020 in response to the pandemic. 
1. The Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) was announced on 15 March 
at a rate of €203 per week, increased to €350 per week following an 
announcement on 24 March. The generosity of the PUP was gradually 
decreased so that, by September 2020, recipients received either €203, €250 
or €300 per week, depending on their pre-pandemic earnings. It is this version 
of the PUP that we model in SWITCH. Although reduced from its initial flat rate 
of €350, the PUP is still more generous that the standard personal rate for 
Jobseekers’ supports. The PUP is closed to new applicants from January 2021 
while the payment itself will be discontinued in Spring 2021.  
2. On 19 March, the Minister for Social Protection introduced the Employer 
Refund scheme by which employees could remain on company payrolls while 
receiving the amount of the COVID-19 Support Payment, the cost of which 
would be reimbursed to relevant businesses. This scheme was superseded by 
the Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) from 26 March, allowing 
employers to claim subsidies of up to €410 per week for eligible employees 
they retain on payroll. The TWSS was replaced on 1 September by the 
Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme (EWSS) which provides a two-tier subsidy 
of €151.50 or €203 per employee to employers who have suffered a loss in 
turnover of at least 30 per cent. This scheme will remain in operation until 
Spring 2021. As our focus in the COVID – September policy response scenario is 
on the tax-benefit scheme in place just preceding the budget, it is the EWSS 
that is examined in the analysis that follows.  
3. As part of the July Stimulus, the standard rate of VAT was cut from 23 per cent 
to 21 per cent from September 2020 until February 2021 to aid a wide range 
of economic activities. 
 
This scenario, COVID – September policy response, is compared to the COVID – no 
policy response scenario in order to show the cost and distributional effect of these 
supports.10 A key assumption in this stage of the analysis is the number of jobs 
supported by the EWSS that would have been lost in the absence of this policy 
measure. Our central assumption is that 50 per cent of jobs supported by the EWSS 
would have been lost in the absence of this policy measure11 but, in the next 
 
                                                            
 
10  In each case, policy rules are indexed in line with forecast CPI growth between 2020 and 2021 (Central Bank of Ireland, 
2020).  
11  We have arbitrarily chosen the halfway point, 50 per cent, as it is not possible to know what the true figure is.  
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section, we show how sensitive our estimation of the cost of the pandemic income 
supports is to this assumption.  
 
In the third stage of the analysis, we incorporate changes announced in Budget 
2021. The elements of Budget 2021 that we model consist of changes to direct 
taxes, indirect taxes and social welfare payments which we list in Appendix A and 
briefly detail here.  
 
Although most tax credits and bands were frozen in cash terms – amounting to a 
small effective tax increase given forecast inflation of 0.2 per cent – some cuts to 
direct taxes on personal income were announced. The point that the main rates of 
Universal Social Charge (USC) and class A employer pay related social insurance 
(PRSI) begin to apply were increased slightly while a reduced rate of USC for 
Medical Card holders was extended by a year. The earned income tax credit (EITC) 
available to self-employed workers was also increased (by €150 to €1,650 per year) 
meaning that most self-employed will now pay the same income tax as employees 
with the same level of earnings.12 
 
There were more substantial reductions in indirect taxes, with a temporary 
14-month cut in the rate of VAT charged on hospitality and hairdressing (from 
13.5 per cent to 9 per cent) and cash freezes (small effective cuts) in alcohol duties. 
However, there were also increases in tobacco products tax (equivalent to an extra 
50 cents per pack of 20 cigarettes) as well as a well-flagged rise in the carbon tax 
(from €26 to €33.50 per tonne).13 
 
While the main rates of most social welfare benefits were frozen in cash terms, 
there were some substantial targeted increases to payments, in part informed by 
ESRI research on how lower income households could be best compensated for a 
rise in the carbon tax (O’Malley et al., 2020). Low income retirees and single adults 
living alone gained from increases to the Living Alone Increase and Fuel Allowance: 
36 per cent and 14 per cent respectively. Low income families with children gained 
from a rise in weekly payments per child, whether in receipt of Jobseekers’ 
payments, One-Parent Family Payment or Working Families Payment. In addition, 
there were increases to the amount that recipients of One-Parent Family Payment 
 
                                                            
 
12  The incomes of self-employed workers will continue to be subject to higher rates of USC above €100,000 per year but 
benefit from more favourable PRSI treatment than the earnings of employees (Roantree et al., 2018). The Budget also 
announced the extension of various direct tax reliefs for companies and first-time buyers of newly built homes, none 
of which are incorporated in our analysis given the focus is on household incomes. 
13  There were also changes to the way that cars registered from January 2021 will be taxed, both on registration in the 
form of Vehicle Registration Tax (VRT) and recurrently (motor tax). However, we do not model either of these changes 
as our SILC data do not contain sufficiently detailed information on car ownership.  
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and Disability Allowance could earn before seeing their payment means-tested, 
and to the Carer’s Support Grant paid annually to those in receipt of the Carer’s 
Allowance, Carer’s Benefit and Domiciliary Care Allowance.14  
 
Comparing outcomes in the COVID – September policy response and COVID – 
Budget 2021 scenarios gives the additional cost and distributional effect of the 
direct and indirect tax and welfare measures announced in Budget 2021, compared 
to a price-indexed version of the September 2020 tax-benefit system. 
 
3. COST 
Table 2 displays the monthly cost of pandemic-related unemployment, of the 
accompanying supports in operation as of September 2020 and of Budget 2021.  
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show the cost of pandemic-related unemployment, 
calibrated to match August 2020 levels, under two assumptions: (1) no jobs 
supported by the EWSS would have been lost in the absence of this policy and 
(2) 50 per cent of jobs supported by the EWSS would have been lost in the absence 
of this policy. The net Exchequer impact of the pandemic unemployment shock 
ranges between -€341 million and -€745 million depending on how EWSS is 
treated. In our central scenario (in column 2), where 50 per cent of jobs supported 
by EWSS would be lost without this policy intervention, the loss in Exchequer 
revenues of €745 million per month is almost equally driven by a reduction in 
tax/SIC revenue (-€365 million per month) and an increase in welfare expenditure 
(+€380 million per month).  
 
Comparing this scenario to one in which the PUP and EWSS are introduced in 
column 3 shows a larger loss in Exchequer revenue of €831 million per month. It is 
notable however, that much of this Exchequer loss would have been experienced 
in the absence of these policies, assuming that the EWSS is saving 50 per cent of 
the jobs it supports. Even if we assume that the EWSS is saving no jobs, close to 
half of this Exchequer loss would have been experienced (see net Exchequer 
impact of -€341 million per month in column 1). This is because, in the absence of 
the PUP and EWSS, the existing tax-benefit system would have helped stabilise 
incomes, for example through increased Jobseeker’s Benefit or Assistance 
payments. These estimates suggest that, at most, the PUP and EWSS are doubling 
the Exchequer cost of COVID-related unemployment, although it is likely that their 
 
                                                            
 
14  There was also a postponement of the planned rise in the qualifying age for the State pension, which we do not model. 
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marginal cost is significantly less than this, depending on how crucial the EWSS is 
to job retention.  
 
The effect of Budget 2021, in column 4, is to slightly increase the monthly 
Exchequer cost, primarily through an increase in welfare expenditure. 
 
TABLE 1 THE COST OF COVID-19 RELATED EMPLOYMENT IN TERMS OF DIRECT TAX AND 
WELFARE 
 Cost (€million per month) 
  

















Change in earnings -503 -1,080 -778 -778 
(a) Change in tax/SIC revenue -173 -365 -277 -276 
(b) Change in welfare expenditure 168 380 335 345 
     Pandemic Unemployment Payment 0 0 272 270 
(c) Employment Wage subsidy scheme 0 0 219 219 
Net Exchequer impact (a-b-c) -341 -745 -831 -839 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels. 
Notes: (1) no direct/indirect tax or welfare policies implemented. Assumes no jobs supported by the EWSS would have been lost in the 
absence of this policy.  
(2) no direct/indirect tax or welfare policies implemented. Assumes 50 per cent of jobs supported by the EWSS would have been 
lost in the absence of this policy. 
(3) direct and indirect tax and welfare policies implemented up to September 2020. 
(4) direct and indirect tax and welfare policies announced in Budget 2021. 
 
4. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT 
Figure 1 shows the distributional effect of pandemic-related unemployment with 
and without accompanying supports and Budget 2021 measures. We first examine 
the impact of pandemic job losses without targeted supports on income 
distribution (COVID – no policy response). We then turn to the effect of the PUP, 
EWSS and cut to the standard rate of VAT on household income (COVID – policy 
response) before showing the cumulative effect of these supports and Budget 2021 
measures (COVID – Budget 2021).  
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FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT LOSSES WITH AND WITHOUT SEPTEMBER 
COVID POLICIES AND BUDGET 2021 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using ITSim linked to the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey uprated to 2021 prices, and SWITCH run on 
2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels.  
Notes:  Quintiles are based on equivalised household income, using CSO national equivalence scales. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of each scenario across the distribution of household 
income, adjusted for family size, with the population divided into five equally sized 
groups (quintiles) ordered from lowest- to highest income, left-to-right. We 
estimate that pandemic-related unemployment has decreased household income 
by 7 per cent. However, this loss is not equally distributed. Households in the 
lowest quintile group saw little change to their income as (1) they are less likely to 
contain a worker and to be exposed to the unemployment shock and (2) the 
existing tax-benefit system (e.g. Jobseeker’s Benefit, Jobseeker’s Assistance etc.) 
does a good job of sheltering the incomes of those in this income quintile from job 
losses. Losses increase further up the income distribution with those in the upper 
half of the income distribution experiencing the largest income loss of between 
7 per cent and 9 per cent. 
 
The initial policy response to the pandemic (PUP, EWSS and cut to the standard 
rate of VAT) decreases the average household income loss from 7 per cent to 3 per 
cent. Households in the lowest two income quintiles experienced small income 
gains compared to a Pre-COVID scenario as a result of the generous rate of PUP 
and the cut to the standard rate of VAT. This phenomenon is also highlighted in 
Beirne et al. (2020), which examines the distributional effect of the more generous 
flat-rate PUP of €350 per week. Losses are small in quintiles three and four. 
Only quintile five still experiences large average income losses of 6.5 per cent 





























Covid - no policy response Covid - September policy response Covid - Budget 2021
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Figure 1 also shows the additional effect of Budget 2021 on income distribution. 
Budget 2021 reinforces the trend of the pre-Budget income support policies but 
the magnitude of the effect of Budget 2021 is small compared to the impact of 
employment losses or policies enacted earlier in the year. Figure 2 shows the effect 
of Budget 2021 policy changes alone, distinguishing between direct tax and welfare 
and indirect tax measures. Direct tax and welfare measures result in an average 
increase in disposable income of 0.2 per cent compared to the price indexed 
benchmark. Gains are higher in the lower half of the distribution and are close to 
zero in quintiles four and five, reflecting low rates of social welfare receipt in these 
quintiles. Indirect tax measures result in a negligible increase in disposable income, 
on average, compared to price-indexed policies with the reduction in VAT more 
than offsetting the rise in carbon tax and tobacco duty for most households. 
However, the effect is not uniform and there are small losses at the bottom of the 
income distribution in addition to the small gains at the top of the distribution. 
Taking direct and indirect measures together results in an overall picture of a 
progressive budget, largely driven by the substantial increases to certain welfare 
payments for low income retirees, families with children and adults living alone.  
 
FIGURE 2 BUDGET 2021 COMPARED TO INDEXED SEPTEMBER 2020 POLICY PARAMETERS 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using ITSim linked to the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey uprated to 2021 prices, and SWITCH run on 
2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels.  












Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 All
Direct tax and welfare Indirect tax Total
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5. INEQUALITY 
The impact of the pandemic has not been uniform across different groups of the 
population. Inequalities have been observed by income group, age, gender and 
industry (Adams-Prassl, et al., 2020; Alon et al., 2020; McQuinn, et al., 2020). There 
are also suggestions that the pandemic will result in longer-run effects on 
inequality in income, health, human capital, etc. (Blundell et al., 2020). In this 
section, we show estimates for income inequality and at risk of poverty rates in the 
four scenarios presented above. We also add to the international evidence on the 
unequal effect of the pandemic and show how short-run pandemic-related income 
losses vary by age cohort, gender and industry in Ireland. To do this, we examine 
income at the individual level rather than the family level (discussed in Section 4). 
This necessitates some assumption about how income is split between members 
of a couple. 
 
5.1 Income inequality and at-risk of poverty rates 
Table 3 shows our estimates of income inequality and at risk of poverty rates in the 
four scenarios described above. Income inequality is measured using the widely 
used Gini Index. An increase in this index indicates that income is distributed more 
unequally. At risk of poverty rates are measured with respect to a poverty line 
equal to 60 per cent of median equivalised household income.15  
 
Inequality in market – or pre-tax and transfer – income is 0.51 in the Pre-COVID 
scenario, rising to 0.56 when we account for COVID-related job loss without any 
policy response. The initial policy response reduces this to 0.53 and inequality 
remains at this level in the COVID – Budget 2021 scenario. The Gini of disposable – 
or post-tax and transfer – income is 0.28 in the Pre-COVID scenario. This rises to 
0.29 (+4 per cent) when COVID-related job losses are introduced. The initial policy 
response to COVID and tax-benefit changes in Budget 2021 stabilise the Gini of 
disposable income at 0.28 and 0.27 respectively. This pattern of a predicted rise in 
inequality in the absence of policy intervention and a stabilisation once policy 
changes are taken into account is not unusual compared to our European 
neighbours. Almeida et al., 2020 estimate that in the absence of policy responses, 
the COVID pandemic would have resulted in an average rise in the Gini of 3.6 per 
cent across the European Union but a small fall is estimated (-0.7 per cent) once 
policy measures are taken into account. 
 
 
                                                            
 
15  The CSO’s equivalence scale is used. 
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TABLE 3  INCOME INEQUALITY AND AT RISK OF POVERTY RATES 
 Pre-COVID 









Income inequality     
Gini Market Income 0.51 0.56 0.53 0.53 
Gini Disposable Income 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.27 
At Risk of Poverty rate     
Anchored Poverty rate 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.15 
Anchored Poverty rate - working age 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.16 
Anchored Poverty rate - child 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.19 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels. 
The at risk of poverty rate is calculated based on a poverty line equal to 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable income. 
The CSO equivalence scale is used. Working age defined as aged 18-65 and children those under age 18.  
 
The at risk of poverty rate rises from 0.14 in the Pre-COVID scenario to 0.18 in the 
COVID – no policy response scenario. There are rises of similar magnitudes for 
working age and child subgroups. The direct and indirect tax and benefit reforms 
introduced as part of the COVID policy response cushion most of this increase and 
Budget 2021 continues in the same direction, so that at risk of poverty rates in the 
COVID – Budget 2021 scenario are little higher than those in the Pre-COVID 
scenario. 
 
While the COVID polices in particular have done much to stabilise inequality and 
the at risk of poverty rate, these scenarios indicate how inequality and poverty may 




Figure 3 shows the change in disposable income by age cohort compared to the 
Pre-COVID scenario.16 Clearly the youngest age cohort is most affected by income 
losses due to COVID-related unemployment. We estimate that the 18-29 cohort 
would have lost 15 per cent of disposable income in the absence of targeted 
supports. This is twice the average loss of 7 per cent observed across all age 
cohorts. However, the policy response to COVID-related job losses has been such 
that losses have averaged 3.5 per cent with little difference across age cohorts. 
 
                                                            
 
16  Income is at the individual level rather than the tax-unit level which necessitates some assumption about how income 
is split between members of a couple. We consider each member of a couple as an individual in terms of their market 
income, tax liability and benefit entitlement. One exception is family benefits, such as child benefit, and household 
level benefits, such as housing benefits, which we assume to be shared equally among members of a couple. 
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This implies that the COVID policies are doing most to support the incomes of 
young adults.  
 
FIGURE 3 IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT LOSSES, DIRECT TAX AND WELFARE POLICIES AND BUDGET 
2021 BY AGE 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels. 
To individualise income, household level benefits are split equally between members of a couple.  
 
5.3 Gender 
Figure 4 shows how income losses are distributed by gender, comparing the 
scenario COVID – Budget 2021 to the scenario Pre-COVID. Men are more likely to 
be in employment, pre-COVID, than women and, when they are in employment, 
they tend to have higher average earnings. In line with this, we estimate that men 
lose, on average, more disposable income than women as a result of the pandemic. 
This should be interpreted as a short-term effect as there is evidence in the 
international literature that, in order to cope with increased caring responsibilities, 
women have been more likely than men to switch from employment to inactivity 
or to decrease their hours of work during the pandemic (Adams-Prassl, et al., 2020; 
Alon et al., 2020; Andrew et al., 2020). Neither of these effects are captured by our 
method and they are likely to have knock-on effects on the gender wage gap and 
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FIGURE 4 THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT LOSSES, DIRECT TAX AND WELFARE POLICIES AND 
BUDGET 2021 BY GENDER 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels. 
To individualise income, household level benefits are split equally between members of a couple.  
 
5.4 Industry 
Figure 5 shows the aggregate change in disposable income of workers by industry. 
Before accounting for the PUP and EWSS, those most affected by income losses 
are those working in Hotels and Restaurants and Other, which includes the Arts. 
The policy response to unemployment losses has greatly sheltered the income 
losses for those working in these industries in particular. In the absence of 
economic recovery in these industries, the withdrawal of these policies, scheduled 
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FIGURE 5 THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT LOSSES, DIRECT TAX AND WELFARE POLICIES AND 
BUDGET 2021 BY INDUSTRY 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions data, uprated to 2020 income levels. 
To individualise income, household level benefits are split equally between members of a couple.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
2020 has been a challenging year for employment and incomes in Ireland and has 
proved a severe test of the social welfare system. Significant interventions have 
been made by the Government to support the incomes of those affected financially 
by COVID-19 in the form of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment and wage 
subsidies. In addition the standard rate of VAT was reduced over the summer from 
23 per cent to 21 per cent to help bolster economic activity.  
 
If these initial interventions had not happened, we estimate that pandemic-related 
unemployment would have decreased household income by an average of 7 per 
cent across the population, with significantly larger losses for those who lost their 
jobs. The initial policy response in the form of the PUP, wage subsidy and standard 
rate VAT cut helped protect family incomes and reduce the cost of living so that 
household income fell instead by 3 per cent on average. These losses are sharpest 
at the upper end of the income distribution. At 6 per cent, those in the highest 
income quintile experience a loss more than twice the average. Those in the lowest 
income quintile actually experienced a gain of close to 3 per cent because of the 
cut to VAT and the relative generosity of the PUP compared to prior earnings of 
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We estimate that, in the absence of targeted policies, young adults in the 18-29 
age category would have experienced a particularly large loss in income of over 
14 per cent due to COVID-related job losses. The initial interventions acted to 
reduce this to around 5 per cent, similar to that experienced by older age groups. 
Those working in certain hard-hit sectors – hospitality, for example – would also 
have faced significantly above average falls in income. Again, the initial COVID-
related policies ensured these losses were greatly reduced.  
 
Without these interventions, inequality in market (pre-tax and transfer) income, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, would have risen by close to 10 per cent. Instead, 
our simulations suggest it rose by less than half of that, just under 4 per cent. Once 
taxes and transfers are taken into account the COVID-related interventions actually 
completely stabilised disposable income inequality, a significant feat given the job 
losses experienced. At risk of poverty rates were also stabilised by COVID-related 
policies but there is a risk that they may increase significantly once these supports 
are withdrawn.  
 
While much less costly than the pre-Budget COVID policies, Budget 2021 was also 
progressive in its impact, with above average gains for the bottom two-fifths of the 
income distribution and lower than average gains for those at the upper end. We 
estimate that Budget 2021 will result in small reductions in income inequality and 
the at risk of poverty rate.  
 
There is much debate over how long to continue COVID-related policies such as the 
PUP and EWSS. While pandemic-related unemployment is costly to the Exchequer 
in terms of tax foregone and welfare expenditure, this research has shown that at 
least half (and probably more) of this cost would have been incurred in the absence 
of the COVID policies.  
 
The PUP is due to be continued until April 2021 but closed to new applicants at 
end-2020. Should sufficient employment prospects exist at that time, withdrawing 
the PUP would improve financial incentives for those seeking work to take up 
employment. So too would allowing existing recipients to maintain their payment 
while taking up paid employment for a period of time, as is the case with the self-
employed. This could encourage those in non-viable industries to seek 
employment in other sectors, for which they may need additional training. 
However, if the labour market has not largely recovered by Spring of 2021, then 
the withdrawal of the PUP would be likely to disproportionately affect low-income, 
young, single workers. This group is particularly at risk of a large income shock for 
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two reasons. Firstly, those aged 18-25 living with parents receive a rate of 
Jobseeker’s Assistance that is 45 per cent lower than the rate for those aged 25 
and above.17 Secondly, many young people receiving the PUP are students so may 
not be eligible for Jobseeker’s Assistance in the first place.18 One option available 
to policymakers is a more gradual tapering of the PUP which could help the groups 
most at risk of long-term unemployment after the pandemic to maintain a certain 
standard of living while searching for work. Much will depend on the post-COVID 
recovery and the availability of employment for different age cohorts and in 
different sectors.  
 
Similarly, determining the optimal time to close or withdraw the EWSS – currently 
end-March 2021 – will be challenging. In the long-run, continuing the subsidy 
would mean supporting both employment which would exist even if the subsidy 
was no longer in place (a deadweight cost) and employment which is no longer 
viable in the long term (where employees should be given the opportunity to 
re-train in other roles). Yet withdrawing it too early would lead some firms to fail 
that would otherwise be viable. While close monitoring of the speed and scale of 
the recovery by sector may help inform this difficult decision, there is also a case 
for examining the design of the subsidy for any it does continue for. At present, the 
sharp cut-off in eligibility imposed by the requirement to be experiencing a 30 per 
cent reduction in turnover means some firms may face an incentive to suppress 
output, therefore inhibiting their recovery.  
 
Finally, men appear to have been hardest hit by employment losses in the short 
term, driven by the fact that they are more likely than women to be in employment 
in the first place and tend to have higher earnings. However, in line with the 
international evidence, female participation rates and hours of work in Ireland may 
have changed over the course of 2020 due to child and elderly care pressures. Such 
pandemic-related career interruption may have a knock-on effect on gender gaps 
in earnings and work patterns in the future, which policymakers may wish to 
address.   
 
                                                            
 
17  The personal rate of Jobseeker’s Assistance for those aged 18-25 not living independently and with no dependent 
children is €112.70 per week compared to €203 a week for those aged over 25. 
18  It is estimated that in October 2020 at least 25 per cent of PUP recipients aged under 25 were registered as a full-time 
student (CSO, 2020) and therefore ineligible for Jobseeker’s Assistance or Benefit. 
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The SWITCH model provides a detailed and accurate representation of almost all 
aspects of the Irish personal tax and benefit system. It does not include taxes on 
businesses (like corporation tax), which are difficult to assign to individual 
households, or expenditure on public services which, unlike cash transfers 
provided through the benefit system, are conceptually difficult to assign a value to 
(O’Dea and Preston, 2014).  
 
The ITSim model estimates the indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties, including 
carbon taxes) paid by Irish households on the basis of their reported expenditure, 
collected by the CSO’s nationally representative HBS in 2015-2016. 
 
The main measures we include in our analysis of Budget 2021 using SWITCH are 
given in Table A1. 
 
TABLE A1 MAIN MEASURES IN BUDGET 2021 USING SWITCH 
Income Taxes EITC increase 
USC second rate increase 
Social Welfare 
Carer’s support grant increase 
Living Alone Allowance increase 
Fuel Allowance increase 
QCI changes 
OPFP earnings cap removal 
Working Family Payment increases 
Disability Allowance disregard increased 
Indirect Taxes 
Carbon tax increase 
VAT reduction for hospitality/tourism 
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SOVEREIGN DEBT AFTER COVID-19: HOW THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE 
ECB CAN IMPACT THE RECOVERY PATH OF A MEMBER STATE
 
* Matthew Allen-Coghlan, Kieran McQuinn and Petros Varthalitis1 
ABSTRACT 
The likely substantial impact of COVID-19 related measures on the public finances 
of European countries has prompted an unprecedented call for new and significant 
policies at a European level to alleviate the pressures on individual Member States. 
The administrative closures adopted across most economies has resulted in a 
complete cessation of certain types of economic activity, a significant increase in 
unemployment and profound fiscal challenges for the countries in question. In this 
paper we use a SOE-DSGE model to assess the role the ECB can play in mitigating 
the negative economic and fiscal effects of the crisis for Ireland by participating 
directly in the sovereign debt management of the country. Our results indicate that 
the direct involvement of the ECB via sovereign bonds purchases increases the 
efficiency of the extraordinary fiscal stimulus packages that were put in place to 
combat the negative impact of COVID-19. A fiscal stimulus at the national level 
backed by ECB financing reduces the output losses in the first year which would 
otherwise occur. The reduction in the output loss ranges from 0.5 per cent to 
0.7 per cent depending on the mix of fiscal policies chosen by the State. The 
cumulative reduction in output loss over a five-year horizon could sum to 1.4 per 
cent to 2.2 per cent depending on the fiscal policy mix chosen. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of COVID-19 in 2020 has prompted governments across Europe to 
adopt a range of extraordinary lockdown measures. While necessary from a health 
perspective, the cumulated impact of these measures has resulted in 
unprecedented economic fallout, with millions of workers across Europe being 
made unemployed. To mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic, governments 
across Europe have also initiated extraordinary fiscal responses at a national level. 
In Ireland this has included the introduction of wage support schemes, subsidies 
for business and COVID-19 related unemployment payments.2 These significant 
expenditure measures coupled with the expected fall in taxation receipts due to 
 
                                                            
 
* The authors are economists at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). They can be contacted at: 
matthew.allencoghlan@esri.ie, kieran.mcquinn@esri.ie and petros.varthalitis@esri.ie.  
1  The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee, David Purdue, Diarmaid Smyth, Rossa White and seminar 
participants at the ESRI for helpful comments. We would also like to thank David Purdue and Rossa White for providing 
data. 
2  See Taking Stock: The Fiscal Response to Covid-19. Irish Department of Finance, November 2020. 
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the decline in economic activity will result in the Irish government encountering 
substantial fiscal challenges this year, with key metrics such as the General 
Government Balance and debt-to-GDP ratios set to be adversely impacted. 
 
As the spread of the virus puts pressure on the public finances of countries across 
Europe, the issue of whether European institutions should provide more support 
to Member States has come to the fore. In this context a number of different 
options have been advanced. Blanchard (2020), for example, called for the ECB to 
act directly and buy Italian bonds. Whelan (2020) endorsed the proposal by Gros 
and Mayer (2012) that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) should be 
provided with a liquidity backstop by having it registered as a bank. Alesina and 
Giavazzi (2020) called for the ECB to lift, temporarily, the constraints on its asset 
purchase programme and in particular the capital key. Furthermore, Alesina and 
Giavazzi (2020) suggested that the additional expenditure required by Member 
States to address the COVID-19 issue should be part of an EU programme. Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2020) and Gourinchas (2020) both supported a debt-financed fiscal 
stimulus at the European level.  
 
This article has two main aims. The first is to examine the impact of the unfolding 
pandemic crisis on the Irish economy. The second is to assess the role the ECB can 
play in mitigating the negative demand and supply effects of the crisis for a 
particular Member State by participating directly in the sovereign debt 
management of that country.3 It is not our intention to recommend the most 
effective or preferable form of European intervention but to demonstrate the 
impact a particular form of intervention would have on the recovery path of the 
Irish economy. 
 
To conduct this exercise, we utilise the small open economy dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (SOE-DSGE) model calibrated for Ireland developed in 
Varthalitis (2019).4 The model is extended in three ways. First, we introduce 
demand and supply shocks in the model so as to gauge the adverse impact of the 
pandemic in key macroeconomic aggregates of a small open economy member of 
Eurozone. A significant economic fallout has already occurred in Ireland (see e.g. 
McQuinn et al., 2020). Second, we develop the fiscal block of the model so as to 
incorporate a set of extraordinary fiscal instruments that are used by national fiscal 
authorities to mitigate the negative effect of the pandemic. Third, and, perhaps 
 
                                                            
 
3  There is a growing literature that extends medium scale DSGE models used for policy analysis to study the 
macroeconomic and policy implications of the pandemic. Some examples include Bayer et al. (2020), Faria-e-Castro 
(2020) and Hagedorn and Mitman (2020). 
4  FIR-GEM is a small open economy DSGE model for Ireland. Since the structure of the model is thoroughly analysed in 
Varthalitis (2019), in this paper we mostly focus on the extensions and the policy implications. 
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more importantly, we study the impact of the ECB directly intervening in the debt 
management of a Member State economy. This is accomplished by enhancing a 
SOE model to add a union-wide policymaker that can directly intervene in the debt 
management of the domestic economy. 
 
Under our policy experiment, we assume that two policy authorities can intervene 
in the economy of a member of a currency union, the national fiscal authority (the 
treasury) and a supra-national policymaker (the ECB). The role of the treasury is to 
finance its government expenditure, conventional and extraordinary, by levying 
taxes and/or issuing sovereign bonds. The role of the ECB, under our experiment, 
is to buy sovereign bonds from the Member States and set the union-wide interest 
rate. Each Member State’s public debt can now be held by two types of 
institutional creditors, private markets and/or the ECB. Therefore, with such a 
policy the ECB can generate additional fiscal space for the national governments in 
the short to medium run. The timing of when these bonds will start impacting 
domestic public finances depends on the purchasing policy of the ECB.  
 
In terms of the impact of the pandemic shock, we consider two possible outcomes. 
One outcome involves the impacts of the outbreak fading swiftly with economic 
activity, as a consequence, recovering quite quickly. We refer to as the ‘V-shaped’ 
recovery. We also consider an outcome where the pandemic endures and, thus, 
the adverse effects on the economy are more prolonged. This is referred to as the 
‘long-lasting’ outcome. We calibrate the magnitude of the pandemic shock so as to 
mimic the expected fallout in some key macroeconomic aggregates reported in 
McQuinn et al. (2020).5  
 
Our results indicate that the direct financial assistance of the ECB via sovereign 
bonds purchases increases the efficiency of the extraordinary national fiscal 
stimulus packages. A fiscal stimulus at the national level backed by ECB financing 
reduces the output losses in the first year which would otherwise occur. The 
reduction in the output loss ranges from 0.5 per cent to 0.7 per cent depending on 
the mix of fiscal policies chosen by the Member State. The cumulative reduction in 
output loss over a five-year horizon could sum to 1.4 per cent to 2.2 per cent 
depending on the fiscal policy mix chosen and the size of the fiscal stimulus. In 
terms of national policy, we find that extraordinary expenditures such as spending 
related to enhanced public health, labour income, subsidies and/or cash transfers 
targeted to financially constrained households perform better in countering the 
negative economic impacts of the lockdown. Fiscal packages should target 
households with no other sources of income and, thus, with a higher propensity to 
 
                                                            
 
5  The current analysis is subject to uncertainties due to the unexpected and novel nature of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
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consume. Our article contributes to the growing literature that extends medium 
scale DSGE models used for policy analysis to study macroeconomic and policy 
implications of the pandemic.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; in Section 2 we look at the role that 
could be played by ECB institutions in sharing the debt of Member States. Section 3 
develops the extensions of the model. Section 4 presents the main scenarios 
simulated. Section 5 explains our results and Section 6 outlines some concluding 
comments. For the technical analysis see McQuinn and Varthalitis (2020).6 
2. INCREASED ROLE FOR THE ECB SHARING THE DEBT OF MEMBER 
STATES? 
At the onset of the crisis, the ECB acted swiftly to support Member States through 
accommodative monetary policy. Through the Pandemic Emergency Purchase 
Programme (PEPP) the ECB will purchase €1.35 trillion worth of sovereign 
government debt up to the end of June 2021 or when the COVID-19 ‘crisis phase’ 
is deemed to be over. This has helped alleviate market fears of default for Eurozone 
countries, in turn keeping borrowing costs down (see Schnabel, 2020). Figure 1 
shows that the initial increase in yields experienced by some Eurozone countries 
at the start of the pandemic have largely fallen back to pre-pandemic rates. 
 





Note:  Black dashed line marks the outbreak of the pandemic while the green dashed line marks announcement of PEPP. 
 
                                                            
 
6  In July 2020, McQuinn and Varthalitis (2020) also conducted a quantitative analysis based on year to date information 












Ireland Greece Italy Spain Germany
Q u a rte r ly  Econ om ic  C omm en ta ry  –  Win te r  2020  |  71 
 
 
Prior to the PEPP, the ECB engaged in a number of other asset purchase 
programmes in the post-financial crisis era. These programmes were instigated in 
response to the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area following the financial crisis 
and the anaemic inflation rates throughout the Eurozone in the intervening years. 
Figure 2 shows the amount of long-term Irish government debt held by the 
Eurosystem/ECB between 2005 and 2019. The amount of debt held by private 
markets is also included for comparative purposes. Between 2009 and 2013 there 
was a sharp increase in Irish long-term government debt by held by the 
Eurosystem. This can be attributed to the bailout programme that was introduced 
over this period in which the Eurosystem purchased large sums of Irish government 
debt to make up for the shortfall in the public finances. Eurosystem holdings of 
Irish sovereign bonds continued to increase in the following years until it began to 
temporarily wind down its asset purchase programme in 2018. However, these 
were reintroduced in 2019 and coupled with the large scale purchases of sovereign 
debt as part of PEPP, there are likely to be further increases in ECB purchases of 
Irish government debt in 2020 and beyond. 
 
FIGURE 2  IRISH LONG-TERM DEBT HELD BY THE PRIVATE MARKET/EUROSYSTEM 
 
 
Source: National Treasury Management Agency. 
 
In addition to the monetary policy intervention by the ECB, European Union leaders 
agreed to a multi-year spending package of €1.8 trillion in July 2020. As part of this 
package a €750 billion ‘Next Generation EU’ fund to target the ill effects of the 
pandemic was also agreed. Of the €750 billion, €390 billion will be distributed as 
grants with the rest distributed as loans. This fund will be distributed proportional 
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fund will be joint financed by all members of the European Union. This will ensure 
that countries that have seen their debt levels spike as a result of COVID-19 and 
the administrative closures will not be burdened by further debt. 
3. THE MODEL 
Our model is similar to the medium scale small open economy DSGE model 
developed in Varthalitis (2019). We extend the model in the following ways: first, 
we allow for the negative demand and supply effect of the pandemic in the small 
open economy of a Member State of the EU. Second, we develop the fiscal block 
of the model so as to incorporate a set of extraordinary fiscal instruments that are 
used by national fiscal authorities to mitigate the negative effect of the pandemic. 
Third, we allow for a greater policy role of the ECB in providing financial assistance 
to an individual Member State in the form of sovereign bond purchases (for further 
technical details on these extensions see McQuinn and Varthalitis, 2020). 
 
3.1  DSGE model 
The model developed in Varthalitis (2019) follows a typical household utility 
maximisation subject to a sequential budget constraint. Here the model is adjusted 
to take into account the impact of the pandemic which has a negative impact on 
both demand and supply, e.g. consumption falls from containment policies while 
labour supply is restricted due to the administrative closures and/or the risk of 
workers becoming infected. In response to the pandemic, the Government 
launches a set of extraordinary spending instruments to alleviate the negative 
economic effects. In this model the spending instruments can take a number of 
different forms. The first spending type we look at is expenditure related to public 
health. We assume that this type of spending is a strong complement to private 
consumption. The economic logic of this assumption is that the extreme 
containment measures curtail a large part of consumption activities. Households 
will only be able to restore their levels of private consumption if the Government 
can guarantee a certain level of safety through public health measures. The second 
type of expenditure we look at is a labour income subsidy which is proportional to 
the loss of labour income experienced in the private sector. That is, the 
Government pays back a fraction of the income losses occurred during the 
pandemic. Finally, we look at direct extraordinary cash transfers. To account for 
targeted fiscal policies to different income classes, we allow income subsidies and 
cash transfers to differ between Ricardian (savers) and non-Ricardian (non-Savers) 
households.  
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3.2  Model policy extension 
We extend Varthalitis (2019) by allowing national fiscal policy to use an 
extraordinary set of spending instruments in a discretionary manner while also 
allowing for an enhanced role for the ECB in purchasing Irish sovereign debt. 
 
Institutional composition of public debt 
Following Economides et al. (2020), we assume that Ireland’s public debt can be 
purchased by two types of creditors that differ in their institutional state: (i) private 
markets, i.e. domestic and foreign agents that participate in the domestic and 
international financial markets and (ii) EU institutions (i.e. ECB). Total public debt 
in period t expressed in nominal terms is: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 +  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝐸𝐸      (1) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀  ≡  𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 +  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
∗𝑔𝑔 denotes public debt in private markets and is 
further decomposed in public debt held by domestic private agents, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, and 
foreign private agents, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
∗𝑔𝑔. In what follows, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 will be referred to as 
market-held public debt. 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝐸𝐸  denotes public debt that is purchased by the ECB 
and it will be referred as ECB-held public debt. Below, we assume that each type 
of public debt incurs different borrowing costs, which have different implications 
for the domestic country’s public finances. 
 
Borrowing cost and type of institutional creditor 
We assume that the borrowing cost faced by the small open economy depends on 
the institutional state of the creditor. In terms of public debt in private markets, 
we assume that the interest rate at which Ireland borrows from the private 
markets is debt-elastic (as in e.g. Philippopoulos et al., 2017): 
 






−  1�      (2) 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 ∗  denotes the union-wide interest rate, 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑 is a parameter which measures 
the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to deviations of the market-held 
public debt-to-GDP ratio from its threshold value, ℱ𝑀𝑀. 
 
In terms of public debt purchased by the ECB, we assume that the ECB can lend to 
a Member State at an interest rate lower than the one the Member State would 
face in the private markets, i.e. 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡∗<𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡. This is because the lower interest rate is 
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based on the economic fundamentals and policies of the currency union (e.g. the 
interest rate policy of the ECB). As noted in Reis (2016), in the absence of any 
sovereign risk premium, the two types of bonds are equivalent. However, the 
higher the sovereign risk due to the higher debt levels held by private markets (or 
for other reasons captured in 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑) the larger the importance of the institutional 
type of the creditor. 
 
National Fiscal Policy 
We assume that the Government has two sets of spending instruments:  
1. Conventional nominal government spending, which includes non-utility 
enhancing government consumption, investment, the public wage bill and 
total public transfers; and 
2. A set of extraordinary spending instruments. These include labour income 
subsidies and direct cash transfers targeted to Ricardians and non-Ricardians 
respectively and public health related government spending.  
 
In our experiments, we assume that market-held public debt, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 is adjusted 
residually to satisfy the government budget constraint in each period t; while the 
ECB determines the supply of ECB-purchased public debt, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝐸𝐸  as well as the 
interest rate paid on this debt 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡∗. Ireland is a member of a currency union; thus 
we solve for a monetary regime without monetary independence and a fixed 
exchange rate regime.  
 
We assume that the national fiscal authorities use one or more fiscal instruments 
to only react to public debt held by private markets. This assumption implies that, 
in the short run, the ECB funded public debt does not impose an extra fiscal burden 
on the Member State’s public finances. 
 
This could be thought of as a situation where policymakers suspend the stringency 
of the fiscal targets amid the pandemic crisis. We have already seen this with the 
suspension of fiscal rules from the EU. As a result, there is less of an immediate 
need for domestic policymakers to adjust their fiscal stance in the near term in 
order to reduce their debt burden. Thus, it creates additional fiscal space for 
national fiscal policymakers to adjust their public finances in an attempt to mitigate 
the negative economic effects of COVID-19. 
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On the other hand, it should be noted that public debt held by the ECB enters the 
government budget constraint,7 thus, eventually, it will result in a fiscal cost. 
 
That is, in the medium/long run, the ECB funded debt should be financed either by 
the issuance of new public debt in the private markets or by future fiscal 
adjustment (i.e. tax increases and/or spending decreases). The timing of this 
depends on the ECB policy which is specified in the next section. 
 
Extraordinary fiscal instruments  
To deal with the unprecedented nature of the shock, national fiscal policymakers 
use a set of extraordinary fiscal instruments. The fiscal authority sets these 
instruments in a discretionary manner for the specific time period in which the 
economy is affected by the pandemic. 
  
ECB 
In our model, however, we assume that the ECB can utilise two policy instruments 
to intervene in managing the debt levels of a Member State’s economy, namely 
the union-wide interest rate, 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡∗ and sovereign bonds holdings, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝐸𝐸 . 50F8 In terms of 
sovereign bonds holdings, following Sims and Wu (2020), we assume that ECB 
institutions’ purchases of sovereign bonds are set according to a Taylor-type 
reaction function: 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝐸𝐸 −  𝐹𝐹∗𝐸𝐸 =  𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸




𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 −  𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑� +  𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
   (3) 
where 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 is the share of the public deficit to output deviation from a target, def, 
that the ECB finances via sovereign bond holdings, 𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 capture the speed with 
which these bonds could be reduced and 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 is an iid shock that captures 
discretionary sovereign bonds purchases by the ECB. The policy parameter 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 
governs the share of the domestic deficit-to-output ratio that the ECB allow to be 
financed via ECB bond holdings in period t. The policy parameter 𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 governs the 
duration of the ECB purchasing programme. For example, a short-lived purchasing 
programme, captured by a lower value of 𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 means that the Member State that 
borrows from the ECB will need to generate additional resources in a quicker 
manner to meet its financing needs, either by borrowing purely via private markets 
or by tax/spending adjustments. 
 
                                                            
 
7  See Equation 4 in McQuinn and Varthalitis (2020) for details. 
8  For thorough discussion and modelling of the alternative instruments available at the Eurosystem see Economides et 
al. (2020) and references therein. 
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4. SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
We assume two different recovery outcomes for the Irish economy: a V-shaped 
recovery, where the economy is expected to recover quite quickly; and a long-
lasting outcome, where the negative effects of the pandemic endure for a longer 
period. In the V-shaped outcome, we assume that the containment measures will 
succeed in containing the virus within a short period of time. In terms of the model, 
this means that the pandemic shocks will last one period. If this outcome were to 
materialise, the economy is expected to recover quite quickly. 
 
In the long-lasting outcome, we assume that the supply and demand effects of the 
pandemic will endure for a relatively longer period. This could mean that 
containment measures, e.g. administrative closures, would be released gradually 
and that economic activity will be restored at a slower pace. In terms of the model 
this means that the shocks will die out in around three periods. The magnitude of 
the initial shocks is identical in both scenarios; we only vary the persistence 
parameters and hence the duration of the shocks as opposed to their scale. 
 
4.1 Policy responses 
The Government is assumed to utilise the set of extraordinary fiscal instruments in 
a discretionary manner to mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic. Initially, 
we examine the impact of one fiscal instrument at a time in order to quantify the 
effects on output of each fiscal instrument separately (normalised to 1 per cent of 
steady state output unless otherwise stated). Two alternative public financing 
scenarios of these extraordinary fiscal packages are now considered. 
 
First, via private markets where the emerging public deficits are financed by an 
increase in market-held public debt at the market interest rate. Second, we allow 
the ECB to provide financial assistance to Member States in the form of purchases 
of government bonds.  
5. RESULTS 
5.1  Pandemic impact on the Irish economy 
Figure 3 presents the dynamic responses of the key endogenous macroeconomic 
variables under the two recovery outcomes based on the ‘V-shaped’ and the ‘long-
lasting’ recovery. On the demand side, due to the administrative closures and the 
higher risk of becoming infected, households reduce consumption sharply in the 
short run. Similarly, the rest of the world reduces its demand for Irish goods and 
services resulting in a large reduction in domestic exports. 
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On the supply side, the pandemic shock causes a substantial fall in hours worked. 
Subsequently, the large decrease in hours worked and consumption will also 
reduce investment. As a result, the combined negative impact of demand and 
supply causes a significant reduction in output. 
 
As expected, the combined effects of these shocks have significant implications for 
key fiscal metrics. The large drop in demand and supply leads to a drop in wages 
and returns on capital across sectors. As a result, the tax base of the economy 
which consists of consumption and income from labour and capital is expected to 
experience a significant fall. Accordingly, there is a sharp rise in the national deficit. 
In Figure 3, we assume that the deficit is financed by an increase in borrowing via 
private markets. Thus, the public debt held by private markets increases and this 
puts upward pressure on the sovereign premia. The rise in real interest rates feeds 
back into the economy and further suppresses investment and consumption. 
 
FIGURE 3 DURATION OF THE PANDEMIC SHOCK AND IMPACT ON THE IRISH ECONOMY 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
Note:  GDP, consumption, investment, hours worked and inflation are in % from their steady state values; Market-held public debt and 
deficit-to-GDP are ratios. The sovereign premia is the rate (%). 
 
5.2 The role of policy 
In Table 1 we quantify the implications of the extraordinary national fiscal policy 
measures on output levels in the first year by varying the fiscal policy instrument 
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used to alleviate the negative effect as well as the method of public financing these 
extraordinary fiscal packages. In the first column we report which fiscal instrument 
is used to deal with the economic fallout. The fiscal instruments which are utilised 
are additional spending in ‘public health’, cash transfers targeted at financially 
constrained households, labour income subsidies targeted at financially 
constrained households9 and the spending fiscal mix. The spending mix is a 
combination of the three aforementioned fiscal instruments. We include two types 
of spending mix, the first is labelled 3 per cent, where there is a 1 per cent increase 
in health-related expenditure, cash transfers and labour income subsidies. The 
second is a larger spending mix of 5.5 per cent where there is a 1.5 per cent 
increase in health-related expenditure, a 3 per cent increase in cash transfers and 
1 per cent increase in labour income subsidies. This spending mix is based on the 
forecast growth of expenditure on these items in 2020 relative to 2019. It should 
be noted that there are additional spending instruments available to the Irish 
government such as subsidies to firms but for the purpose of this model we limit 
ourselves to these three instruments. 
 
The results under the two scenarios of public financing; private markets and ECB-
held debt, are presented in the third and fourth column. In the second column, the 
results for when there is no policy intervention at either national or supranational 
level are also presented.10 
 
TABLE 1 FIRST YEAR OUTPUT RECESSION UNDER VARIOUS POLICY SCENARIOS (PERCENTAGE) 
Policy instrument No Policy Market-held debt ECB-held debt 
Health related expenditure -5.1 -4.4 -3.8 
Cash transfers -5.1 -5.0 -4.4 
Labour income subsidies -5.1 -5.0 -4.5 
Spending mix (3%) -5.1 -4.2 -3.5 
Spending mix (5.5%) -5.1 -3.5 -2.8 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
 
In terms of mitigating the negative impact on output, the most effective 
instrument is spending associated with public health. This is followed by a targeted 
fiscal policy which supports the income of non-Savers either via labour income 
subsidies or direct cash transfers. The least effective fiscal instruments are labour 
income subsidies and cash transfers targeted at Savers.11 However, the mitigation 
 
                                                            
 
9  For comparison, the size of fiscal stimulus for each fiscal instrument is normalised to 1 per cent of steady state output. 
10  For comparability, across all three scenarios, the Government uses conventional government consumption to react to 
market-held public debt so as to ensure fiscal sustainability. 
11  We have also examined the case in which the Government increases cash transfers and labour income loss subsidies 
targeted to Savers. However, our results suggest that these extraordinary fiscal instruments are not efficient in terms 
of aggregate output. The economic logic is that Savers have other sources of income, such as access to domestic and 
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effect is quantitatively small in most of the cases when these extraordinary fiscal 
measures are financed solely via newly issued public debt in the private markets 
(see the explanation below). In contrast, when the ECB actively engages in 
sovereign bond purchases, the effect of the extraordinary national fiscal measures 
increases significantly across all fiscal instruments. In particular, increasing 
spending related to public health by 1 per cent of GDP could reduce the output loss 
by 0.6 per cent more when the ECB intervenes, i.e. from 4.4 per cent to 3.8 per 
cent. Similarly, increases in direct cash transfers and labour income subsidies 
targeted to non-Ricardians/non-Savers backed by ECB purchased bonds could 
reduce the output loss by 0.6 per cent and 0.5 per cent, respectively. In terms of 
the spending mix, ECB purchased sovereign bonds to mitigate the recession by 
0.7 per cent compared to the spending mix being funded through private markets. 
 
Finally, the ECB sovereign bonds purchasing programme could enable a quicker 
recovery of the economy. In particular, the cumulative reduction in output loss 
over a five-year horizon relative to debt financing in the private market sum to 
1.5 per cent, 1.5 per cent, 1.4 per cent and 1.8 (or 2.2) per cent for the direct cash 
transfers, labour income subsidies, spending related to public health and the 
spending mix respectively (Table 2). 
 
TABLE 2 CUMULATIVE OUTPUT LOSS OVER FIVE YEARS HORIZON12 (PERCENTAGE) 
Policy instrument No Policy Market-held debt ECB-held debt 
Health Related Expenditure -8.4 -7.9 -6.5 
Cash transfers -8.4 -8.5 -7.0 
Labour income subsidies -8.4 -8.5 -7.0 
Spending mix (3%) -8.4 -8.2 -6.4 
Spending mix (5.5%) -8.4 -8.3 -6.1 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
 
5.3 The underlying mechanism 
Now we examine the mechanism by which the intervention of the ECB can help to 
mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic. We focus on the extraordinary 
spending mix presented in Table 1 and Table 2. Figure 4 compares the dynamic 
responses of the key macroeconomic variables under the two public financing 
scenarios. In particular, the scenarios in which the national deficits are financed via 
market-held public debt and where the national deficits are financed via the ECB. 
These are labelled as ‘Market-bonds financed’ and ‘ECB-bonds financed’ 
respectively. For comparability, we also present results from the scenario in which 
 
                                                            
 
international financial markets, thus it is expected that these fiscal measures will not affect their consumption plans in 
the short run. To save space we exclude these results from Table 1. 
12  Formulas of the cumulative output loss can be found in McQuinn and Varthalitis (2020), Appendix I. 
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there is no policy response at the national and supra-national level; this is labelled 
as ‘No response’. In terms of the key macroeconomic variables, an ECB bond 
purchasing programme can significantly mitigate the negative effect on 
consumption and investment in the short and medium term. This could suppress 
the initial reduction in output and ultimately allows for a quicker recovery in the 
medium term. As expected, on the fiscal side, financing the emerging deficits via 
the less costly ECB bond holdings allows extra fiscal space for the Member State in 
the short and medium term. Thus, the rise in the deficit and public debt is far less 
prolonged in this case. 
 
FIGURE 4 NATIONAL FISCAL PACKAGE AND PUBLIC FINANCING SCENARIOS 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
 
Borrowing from the ECB leads to a smaller rise in market held public debt in the 
short run while it also keeps public debt in the medium/longer run at low levels 
despite the increase in national deficits. ECB-held public debt absorbs the 
temporary fiscal imbalances and thus stabilises domestic public finances in the 
medium/longer run. Lower public debt issued in private markets subsequently 
leads to lower real interest rates. Since the latter affects households’ economic 
decisions, it makes national extraordinary fiscal measures more effective by 
crowding out less investment and consumption. In turn, the milder reduction in 
consumption and investment leads to a faster recovery in hours worked. Thus, 
labour and capital incomes of households experience a smaller decline which 
creates a further positive feedback loop on output. This results in a milder 
reduction in the associated tax bases, resulting in a lower rise in the national deficit 
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across all time horizons. The combined effect of a lower rise in interest rates and a 
smaller decline in the tax revenues leads to a smaller rise in the national deficit. 
Overall, the ECB bond holdings can play a role of foreign financial capital flows in 
the resource constraint of the small open economy (i.e. the balance of payments) 
which can help the Member State economy to mitigate the negative effects of the 
pandemic. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
As with most Western economies, both the impact of the COVID-19 virus itself and 
the measures taken by the public authorities to counter the spread of the virus will 
have a dramatic and negative impact on the Irish economy. We model the impact 
of the virus with a standard SOE-DSGE model with both demand- and supply-side 
shocks. In simulating the impact of the shock, we assume two potential outcomes, 
(i) a V-shaped recovery where the containment measures succeed in containing 
the virus within a short period of time and (ii) a long-lasting recovery, where the 
supply and demand effects of the pandemic will endure over a longer period. 
 
Our model based results indicate that an ECB bond purchasing programme 
significantly mitigates the negative effect of the virus-related shock on 
consumption and investment in the short and medium run. As a result, the impact 
on economic output is also reduced with a quicker recovery being facilitated in the 
medium run. Under our policy experiment, the ability of a Member State to finance 
part of the emerging deficit via less costly ECB bond holdings results in extra fiscal 
space for the domestic authorities in the short and medium run. This reduces the 
subsequent increase in the deficit and public debt than would otherwise be the 
case.  
 
In light of the policy measures announced to date, it is fair to say that EU 
institutions generally have committed to playing a more expansive role in dealing 
with the present crisis then in previous cases. In order to maximise the efficiency 
of this support, it is important to be able to quantify the impact of this greater 
involvement on both Member States’ key fiscal variables and growth outlooks. We 
believe our paper makes a significant contribution in that regard. 
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COMPARING TWO RECESSIONS IN IRELAND: GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS VS COVID-19
 
* Matthew Allen-Coghlan and Petros Varthalitis1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The rate at which the COVID-19 pandemic has spread across the globe and the 
damage it has caused to so many countries is unprecedented in modern times. Not 
since the spread of the Spanish Flu over 100 years ago has there been a global 
health crisis of this scale and severity. The economic impact of COVID-19 is also 
global and already the pandemic has had a significant adverse impact on the world 
economy. However, we do not have to go back a century to find a global economic 
shock of this scale. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was just over ten years ago and 
like the current economic crisis it spread throughout the world impacting advanced 
and developing economies alike.  
 
The Irish economy was no exception and much has been written on the devasting 
impact of the resulting recession.2 Given the severity of that recession and how 
recently it occurred, a natural question arises around the similarities and 
differences between the GFC and the one currently being experienced as a result 
of the pandemic.  
 
Recently, other commentators have also compared the economic impact of the 
COVID-19 crisis with past major global crises. For example, De Grawe and Ji (2020) 
compare the COVID-19 crisis, the GFC and the 1933 Great Depression using 
indicators of the world economy. Buti (2020) compares the GFC with COVID-19 
crisis for the EU economy and Wheelock (2020) compares the COVID-19 crisis with 
the Great Depression focusing on the US economy.  
 
In this Research Note we explore how both crises impacted various aspects of the 
Irish economy. In order to do that we analyse key economic indicators across both 
periods comparing and contrasting the rapidity and the magnitude of the shock 
caused by each crisis. We focus on three types of indicators: hard indicators, which 
 
                                                            
 
1  The authors are economists at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). They can be contacted at: 
matthew.allencoghlan@esri.ie and petros.varthalitis@esri.ie. The authors are solely responsible for the views 
expressed in the paper. The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee, Kieran McQuinn and seminar 
participants at the ESRI Quarterly Macro Meetup for comments and suggestions. 
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can be thought of as a measure of realised outcomes, soft indicators which can be 
thought of as a measure of expectations and policy responses, both at a national 
and EU level. 
 
The rest of this Note is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
nature of the two shocks and the differences in the economy entering into both 
periods. Section 3 compares various hard indicators across both periods while 
Section 4 compares soft indicators. Section 5 discusses the different policy 
response to both crises, both at a national and EU level. Section 6 concludes.  
2. NATURE OF THE SHOCKS 
Before examining the impact that both crises have had on the Irish economy, we 
first outline the nature of the two shocks and the differences in how they 
manifested themselves in the economy. 
 
The initial trigger for the GFC started with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the 
United States in 2008. Due to the interconnectedness of the global financial 
system, credit dried up globally and the lack of liquidity transmitted to European 
financial markets. The problem intensified in several Eurozone countries with the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
 
While this initial trigger originated outside the Irish economy, it was endogenous 
structural distortions within the economy that magnified the shock through the 
Irish system. These distortions were in the form of the property market and credit 
bubbles that had emerged in the Irish economy over the prior decade. Banks and 
households were overleveraged in this regard and the Irish government had 
become increasingly reliant on revenues from the property sector. Thus, when 
these twin bubbles burst banks became insolvent, households fell into negative 
equity and the public finances collapsed. 
 
The COVID-19 crisis on the other hand is the definition of an exogenous shock.3 
This unpredictable health crisis emerged from outside the economic system and 
thus far has not been propagated by structural distortions in the economy in the 
same way the GFC was. One of the ways this is evidenced is by comparing the 
amount of leverage in the system across both periods. 
 
Figure 1 shows the household debt in the country since 2003. Going into the 
previous recession the level of household debt had been increasing sharply and by 
 
                                                            
 
3  See Danielsson et al. (2020). 
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Q1 2008 it was up over €200 billion. By comparison, in Q1 2020 the level of 
household debt was just over €130 billion following a decade in which household 
debt has been falling steadily. The difference between both periods is even more 
stark when taken relative to disposable income. In Q1 2008 household debt to 
disposable income was up over 200 per cent in comparison to just over 100 per 
cent in Q1 2020.  
 
FIGURE 1 HOUSEHOLD DEBT  
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland.  
 
Another metric of the amount of leverage in the system is the credit gap. The credit 
gap is a measure of the difference between the actual and long-run trend level of 
the credit-to-GDP ratio.4 When the gap is positive, the current level of the ratio is 
greater than trend and when the gap is negative the current level of the ratio is 
less than trend. If the gap becomes significantly large, this may suggest that the 
level of credit in the economy is unsustainable. Going into the GFC the credit gap 
had peaked at just under 70 per cent. However, since then there has been a steady 
decline in the credit gap which hasn’t been positive since 2009. Going into the 
pandemic crisis the credit gap remained around 0 per cent indicating that the 
amount of credit in the economy was not at an unsustainable level.  
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FIGURE 2 CREDIT GAP (%) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland.  
 
Both measures show that there was significantly less leverage in the system going 
into the COVID-19 crisis in comparison to the GFC. One of the reasons for this is 
likely a result of the introduction of a number of regulatory measures which were 
put in place post the GFC recession. These include the macroprudential rules and 
the counter-cyclical capital buffer which have been designed to reduce the amount 
of credit in the Irish economy.5 
3. HARD INDICATORS 
3.1 Quarterly indicators 
When the pandemic first took effect there was an expectation amongst most policy 
institutions and forecasters that there would be a decline in Ireland’s output in 
2020 greater than anything the country had experienced before.6 The largest 
decline in output was expected to come in Q2, the period over which the strictest 
phases of the lockdown would be in place. However, National Account data shown 
in Figure 3 reveal that while the decline in output in Q2 was significant it was not 
unprecedented. In Q2 2020 real GDP growth fell by just under 4 per cent compared 
to the same quarter the previous year. During the previous recession we saw much 
greater declines in GDP over multiple quarters. In every quarter between 2008 and 
2009 there was a decline in annual GDP growth and over four of these quarters the 
 
                                                            
 
5  For further discussion on the impact of these financial stability measures see: Lozej and O’Brien (2018) and Economides 
et al. (2019). 
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negative GDP growth was greater than that experienced in Q2 2020. The largest 
decline came in Q4 2008 when real GDP fell by over 10 per cent compared to the 
same period the previous year.  
 
FIGURE 3 REAL GDP GROWTH (YEAR-ON-YEAR)  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
  
Figure 4 also shows output growth for the Irish economy except here the economy 
is divided into the tradable and non-tradable sectors.7 The impact of the pandemic 
crisis on the domestic sector is indeed unprecedented, with the decline in output 
in the non-tradable sector much greater than anything that was seen during the 
previous recession. The largest decline in real GVA in the non-tradable sector 
during the previous recession was in Q1 2009 when output declined by over 10 per 
cent compared to the same period the previous year. The annual decline in Q2 
2020 was nearly double that, with a negative growth rate of just over 19 per cent. 
In contrast, the impact on the tradable sector during the current crisis has been 
much more benign than anything experienced during the GFC recession. In 
Q2 2020 the tradable sector actually experienced positive output growth, up over 
2 per cent compared to the same period the previous year. This compares to 
sizeable declines in output growth in the tradable sector during the previous 
recession. The dichotomy between the performance of the tradable and non-
tradable sectors is an example of how the current pandemic crisis is having very 
 
                                                            
 
7  The tradable and non-tradable GVA are defined as in Bergin et al. (2017). A sector is defined as tradable if at least 
50 per cent of total final uses (excluding change in stocks) is exported. The tradable sectors (NACE classification): 
Industry (excl. Construction), Information and Communication, Financial and Insurance Activities, Professional, Admin 
and Support Services. Non-tradable sectors (NACE classification): Agriculture, Forestry and fishing, Construction, 
Distribution, Transport, Hotels and Restaurants, Real estate activities, Public admin, Education and Health, Arts, 
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different impacts on different sectors of the economy. The fact that the overall 
decline in output in Q2 was relatively benign despite such an unprecedented 
decline in the non-tradable sector also highlights how important the tradable 
sector is to the fortunes of the Irish economy. Within the tradable sector, it was 
the strong performance of just a small number of sectors, namely pharmaceutical 
and computer services that accounted for the positive growth over this period.8 
 
FIGURE 4 REAL GVA GROWTH, TRADABLE AND NON-TRADABLE SECTORS (YEAR-ON-
YEAR) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
3.2 Monthly indicators 
The following hard indicators have a monthly time frequency which has the 
advantage of giving us more up-to-date data points for the current pandemic which 
would not be available with quarterly data. Monthly data also allow us to see how 
the economic indicators react to sudden shifts in policy and sentiment which is 
especially important given the rapidly changing nature of the current health crisis. 
So as to compare and contrast the evolution of these indicators between the 
pandemic recession and the GFC we overlay the monthly data from both periods. 
In order to do this we first choose a turning point which marks the month prior to 
which the recession began in both periods. Choosing the month in which the 
recession began for the pandemic crisis is quite straightforward as the first 
lockdown restrictions were put in place in March 2020. Therefore, February 2020 
is identified as the turning point for the pandemic crisis. Identifying the turning 
point for the GFC is not as straightforward as there is a not a single month we can 
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identify as to when the recession started over this period. We therefore base this 
turning point on retail sales. Retail sales are sensitive to both underlying economic 
conditions and economic sentiment and so this a reasonable economic indicator 
on which to base the turning point.9 Based on the retail sales data we identify 
January 2008 as the turning point i.e. the month before we see a large decrease in 
retail sales volume over consecutive months. Overlaying the two periods based on 
these turning points we then compare the scale and rapidity of the shocks to these 
indicators across both periods. 
 
Figure 5 shows that after the initial lockdown restrictions were brought in in March 
retail sales collapsed. At this time, the country was in strictest phase of the 
lockdown when many retailers were forced to close their doors. By April, the total 
volume of retail sales was down nearly 50 per cent compared to the period 
immediately preceding the lockdown. However, the recovery in retail sales has 
been equally sharp with the volume of sales increasing above pre-lockdown levels 
just four months after the initial turning point. In contrast during the GFC the 
decline in retail sales was much more gradual. Over the 12 months after the GFC 
turning point, retail sales declined by around 20 per cent and remained at this 
lower level over the next three years. The V-shaped recovery of retail sales is likely 
a result of pent-up demand following the months in which consumers were unable 
to access retail stores as well as improved expectations for the future economic 
and policy outcomes (see Section 5). 
 
 
                                                            
 
9  Our key results do not change if we employ an alternative indicator so as to identify the turning point of the GFC. 
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FIGURE 5 RETAIL SALES, VOLUME ADJUSTED (INDEX, T0=100) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 6 shows the unemployment rate over the two recessions. During the GFC 
there was a gradual increase in the unemployment rate which continued to rise 
over a four-year period after the initial turning point, eventually peaking at just 
over 16 per cent. In contrast during the current recession the increase in the 
unemployment rate has been much sharper, peaking at over 30 per cent just two 
months after the turning point.10 In the subsequent months, as the lockdown 
restrictions were eased, there was also a sharp recovery in the unemployment rate. 
However, the momentum of this recovery began to slow in Q3 and there has been 
a spike in the unemployment rate in the most recent data as a result of the Level 5 
lockdown, though not as steep as that seen during the first lockdown. One of the 
main differences between the two periods in how Ireland deals with the shock to 
the labour market is the migration channel. Historically, outward migration has 
acted as a release valve for pressure in the Irish labour market with large levels of 
emigration synonymous with recessions in the country. For this reason, the 
unemployment rate during previous recessions such as the GFC was likely subdued 
by the thousands of Irish people who sought work outside the country. Given the 
current restrictions around international travel and the significant economic 
contraction being experienced by most of the world’s major economies, the ability 
of Irish workers to seek work outside the country has greatly reduced. While 
emigration would not act as a panacea to the pandemic unemployment crisis given 
 
                                                            
 
10  The unemployment rate referenced since March 2020 is what the CSO refers to as the upper-bound. This counts all 
those on the Pandemic Unemployment Programme as being unemployed. The unemployment rate according to the 
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the large estimates of people unemployed, the inability of people to emigrate for 
work is likely contributing to the elevated unemployment rate. 
 
FIGURE 6 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
Note:  The unemployment rate includes those on the Pandemic Unemployment Payment which is the upper bound of the CSO’s 
unemployment data. 
 
At the onset of COVID-19 it was uncertain what impact the pandemic would have 
on inflation due to the shock to both the supply and demand side of the economy. 
On the supply side many businesses have been forced to close and workers in some 
industries have been prevented from going to their jobs. Globally, supply chains 
have been significantly disrupted and international trade has been disturbed. On 
the demand side there have been significant declines in consumption and large 
increases in savings.11 While both these effects should pull inflation in opposite 
directions, the initial data we have after the turning point shows that the country 
has entered a period of deflation, indicating that the pandemic might have a 
greater impact on the demand side of the economy. The inflation rate has gone 
from just over 1 per cent before the initial lockdown to about -1.5 per cent in 
September. Though the decline in energy prices has contributed to this deflation, 
core inflation which excludes energy prices and unprocessed foods is also negative 
(-0.6 per cent in September). Going into the previous recession the inflation rate 
was at a much higher rate of 5 per cent, a symptom of the economic boom that 
the country was experiencing at that time. However, as the recession took effect 
there was large negative impact on prices which started to decline ten months 
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after the turning point. The CPI continued to decline for another year with prices 
bottoming out at negative 6 per cent about 22 months after the initial turning 
point. It wasn’t for another 12 months that price growth turned positive, showing 
that deflation in the economy can be quite persistent. 
 
FIGURE 7 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
4. SOFT INDICATORS 
In order to compare how expectations have differed over the two recessions we 
also draw on a number of soft indicators, the first of which is consumer confidence. 
In the first few months after the turning point of the COVID-19 pandemic there was 
a sharp decline in consumer confidence. By May 2020 consumer confidence had 
bottomed out at just over 97 index points. However, in recent months there has 
been some evidence of increased consumer optimism with the index rising in four 
consecutive months since May. 
 
During the previous recession consumer confidence remained below its 
pre-turning point level for a number of years. The oscillating path of the Consumer 
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FIGURE 8 CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDEX (T0=100) 
 
 
Source:  OECD.  
 
Figure 9 shows the composite Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for the 
manufacturing and services sectors. The PMI is based on a monthly survey of senior 
executives at private market companies and gives an indication of underlying 
business conditions and sentiment. A value over 50 indicates that there is an 
expansion on the previous month while a value below 50 indicates there is a 
contraction. Like the Consumer Sentiment Index, there was an initial sharp decline 
in the PMI as the lockdown was brought in in March. The PMI fell below 20 in April 
which was a record low for the Index. Though the Index briefly rose above 50 in 
subsequent months, this is a month-on-month indicator and so the increase is 
relative to the very low point reached in April. Indeed, the most recent data are 
again below 50 indicating a contraction on previous months. During the GFC the 
PMI declined below 50 immediately after the turning point and remained below 
50 for over two years thereafter, meaning that for 24 straight months, private 
market companies viewed underlying business conditions as being less favourable 
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FIGURE 9 PURCHASING MANAGERS INDEX  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
The final indicator compared between the two periods is the ISEQ Index which is 
benchmark stock index of the 20 largest companies that trade on the Irish stock 
market. This index captures investor sentiment about the future prospects of these 
Irish companies and thus is an indicator of the market’s expectations about future 
economic conditions. As with the other soft indicators there was an initial sharp 
decline in the index after the turning point March. However, unlike the other soft 
indicators the recovery has been rapid and the most recent data show that the 
index is at a greater value than it was entering into the lockdown. The relatively 
robust performance of the stock market may indicate that investors are optimistic 
about the future business conditions and that once the virus is brought under 
control there is an expectation that the economy will be able to pick back up where 
it left off. This is a stark contrast to the previous recession when stock prices 
plummeted by 70 per cent from their pre-lockdown levels and remained low for a 
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FIGURE 10 ISEQ (INDEX, T0=100) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
5. POLICY RESPONSE 
The final comparison we draw between the two periods is in the area of the policy 
response. There has been a significant difference in how policymakers at both a 
national and European level have responded to both crises.  
 
As the lockdown restrictions were brought in in March 2020, the Irish Government 
immediately launched a large fiscal stimulus package to mitigate the negative 
economic effect of the pandemic. Equally important has been the response of the 
ECB which, through its accommodative monetary policy, has facilitated the 
national fiscal expansion.  
 
The combined national (fiscal) and ECB (monetary) policy responses during the 
COVID-19 pandemic are in sharp contrast with the associated responses during the 
GFC. At the time of the GFC, national fiscal policy was much more restrictive due 
to the multiannual fiscal consolidation programme implemented mostly via 
spending cuts. The ECB was also implementing tighter monetary policy during the 
initial phase of the GFC, partly a result of the asymmetric impact of the GFC on 
different Eurozone countries. 
5.1 National fiscal policy 
Regarding national fiscal expenditures, Table 1 shows the annual growth in 
government expenditure in 2008/2009 and 2020 (Budget 2021 forecasts). 
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in comparison to the previous year. In percentage terms the largest increase is in 
the area of subsidies which are forecast to increase by 266 per cent (€4.5 billion) 
this year as a result of the implementation of various wage subsidy schemes and 
subsidies to firms impacted by the lockdowns. Social benefit payments are forecast 
to increase by about 28 per cent (€8.6 billion) as a result of the large increase in 
people receiving welfare payments including the Pandemic Unemployment 
Payment (PUP). The use of goods and services is also expected to increase 
substantially resulting from increased health-related expenditure. In total Irish 
government expenditure is expected to increase by 23 per cent (€19.0 billion) in 
2020. Interest payments are the only expenditure heading that are forecast to 
experience a reduction in 2020 with respect to 2019, due to the fall in the cost of 
borrowing. In 2008/2009 interest payments increased partly due to the increased 
cost of borrowing over this period (see Section 5.2 for more). 
 
TABLE 1 EXPENDITURE GROWTH BY HEADING (YEAR-ON-YEAR) 





Compensation of employees 7 -2 3 
Use of goods and services 3 -1 40 
Subsidies 7 -2 266 
Interest 21 42 -14 
Social benefits 13 10 28 
Total 10 7 23 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and Budget 2021. 
Note: 2020 figures on forecasts from Budget 2021. 
 
In terms of revenues, so far during the COVID-19 recession total tax receipts have 
experienced a relatively mild decrease compared to the sharp fall that was 
experienced over the years of the GFC. Figure 11 illustrates that this difference is 
mostly driven by two tax headings; corporation and income taxes. 
 
The most significant difference between the pandemic crisis and the GFC is in 
corporation taxes. Despite the deterioration in economic activity, corporation 
taxes have increased by over 11 per cent in 2020. By comparison corporation taxes 
fell by 23 and 26 per cent in 2008 and 2009, respectively. After years of significant 
growth,12 corporation taxes also account for a larger share of total tax receipts than 
they did during the GFC. Their strong performance this year is the main reason why 
total receipts have held up reasonably well, declining by just 5 per cent compared 
to 15 and 21 per cent in 2008 and 2009. The decline in income taxes has also been 
relatively muted in 2020 despite the large increase in unemployment. This is a 
 
                                                            
 
12  See Varthalitis (2019) and IFAC (2019). 
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result of those who have lost their jobs typically being in lower paid sectors, 
Ireland’s progressive taxation system and the various wage subsidy schemes that 
have kept workers on their employers’ payroll. The declines in VAT receipts are 
much more in line with what we saw during the previous recession, down by 19 per 
cent in 2020 compared to 8 per cent and 23 per cent in 2008 and 2009.13  
 
FIGURE 11 TAX RECEIPTS GROWTH BY HEADING (YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
 
 
Source:  Fiscal Monitor. 
5.2  Eurozone and EU policy 
One of the most striking differences between COVID-19 and GFC is the policy 
response of EU institutions. 
 
During the period of the GFC the Irish government was solely reliant on the 
international and domestic private markets to borrow and finance its national 
deficits. As the public finances deteriorated at this time the demand for Irish 
government debt from the private markets declined substantially while sovereign 
spreads rose significantly, rendering public debt unsustainable. 
 
Since 2011 as the European Sovereign Debt Crisis took hold the ECB gradually 
began to directly intervene in the sovereign bond markets of Member States. 
This came in the form of various asset purchase programmes which greatly 
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increased the amount of Irish sovereign debt held by the Eurosystem (see 
Figure 12).  
 
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic the ECB has engaged in further sovereign 
bond purchases through the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP).  
 
FIGURE 12 IRISH LONG-TERM DEBT HELD BY THE PRIVATE MARKET/EUROSYSTEM 
 
Source:  National Treasury Management Agency.  
 
The accommodative monetary policy implemented by the ECB has driven 
sovereign bond yields across the Eurozone to record lows. These low yields mean 
that the effective interest rates on Irish debt have lowered despite the increasing 
deficits. These lower borrowing costs have created additional fiscal space for the 
Irish Government to fund the large deficits that will be run in 2020 and 2021.14 On 
the other hand, in the early phase of the GFC, the ECB’s monetary policy was much 
more conservative and the yields on Irish government debt were substantially 
higher, peaking at over 10 per cent as private markets shunned Irish debt. It was 
only through signals from the ECB that it would do ‘Whatever it takes’ to save the 
euro including the aforementioned direct intervention in the bond markets and the 
Irish public finances being brought back under control that interest payments on 
Irish government debt returned to more manageable levels.  
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FIGURE 13 IRISH TEN-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS 
Global Financial Crisis     COVID-19 crisis 
  
 
Source:  Investing.com. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This Note has compared the evolution of key indicators of the Irish economy during 
the current COVID-19 pandemic crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  
 
The scale of the negative shock for most key indicators is much more severe during 
the COVID-19 crisis. However, thus far it seems that the economy bounces back 
much more rapidly than during the GFC where the downward movement was 
gradual and more prolonged.  
 
One of the key differences between this time and then is the relative uniformity in 
how all European countries have been impacted by the virus. During the previous 
crisis the impact on Ireland and other Eurozone periphery countries was much 
different to other core Eurozone countries.  
 
Partly resulting from this, the policy response at a European level has been 
fundamentally different during the two crises. National fiscal and Eurozone 
monetary policies (ECB) have coordinated in a timely manner to support the Irish 
and other Eurozone economies. The large spending programmes run by European 
countries in an attempt to mitigate the economic fallout have in turn been 
supported by the monetary policy that keeps sovereign spreads at low levels. Thus, 
the monetary-fiscal policy nexus is in contrast to the policies implemented during 
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